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Chinese Style VIEs: Continuing to
Sneak under Smog?
Li Guo†
The VIE (Variable Interest Entity) is a business structure that is comprised of a series of contractual arrangements that enable relevant parties
to obtain a degree of control over, as well as a substantial economic interest
in, certain companies without having to directly own their shares. For
about fifteen years, by virtue of the VIE structure and its accounting treatment in the U.S. or Hong Kong, many China-based enterprises were successfully listed overseas, thus circumventing Chinese regulatory control on
foreign equity ownership and investment restrictions in specific industries
such as internet or education. In recent years, however, serious doubts
arose about the validity and viability of the Chinese-styled VIE. Court
judgments, arbitration awards, and administrative decisions from different
sectors and levels have continued to pose challenges to the practice of creating Chinese-style VIEs. The egregious breach of contracts and the chaotic
battles over control have also caused foreign investors to suffer, eliciting
concern from the SEC and HKEx. This Article reviews the structure, origin, and logic of the VIE, and analyzes the evolution and dynamics of such
practice. An argument can be made that China’s best interests would be
served by ending the murky situation surrounding the VIE; stopping this
self-enforced vicious spiral by realigning the interests of the parties
involved. One proposal suggests that a collective and coordinated regulatory framework that is characterized as less restrictive, more transparent,
better defined, and more user friendly, should be set up for the VIE practice; this proposal should be initiated by the State Council and MOFCOM
in particular. Moreover, international cooperation should be strengthened
to better protect investors and deter opportunistic misbehavior.
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Introduction
Listed companies are the most visible business organizations, particularly those in the cross-border setting. Until early 2011, almost half of the
230 Mainland Chinese companies listed on U.S. stock exchanges used the
Variable Interest Entity (VIE) structure.1 In the period that followed, many
companies continued to go public using the VIE structure even under unfavorable circumstances; these companies include such as Vipshop Holdings
(NYSE: VIPS) in 2012, Autohome Inc. (NYSE: ATHM) and Qunar.com
(NASDAQ: QUNR) in 2013, and JD.com (NASDAQ: JD) in 2014.2 In fact,
for more than a decade, the VIE scheme materially bypassed the Chinese
government’s foreign equity investment restrictions by grafting into American accounting treatments and by operating through contractual arrangements instead of direct equity ownership.3 In more recent years, however,
1. Fredrik Öqvist, Statistics on VIE Usage, CHINA ACCT. BLOG (Apr. 11, 2011), http:/
/www.chinaaccountingblog.com/weblog/statistics-on-vie-usage.html.
2. Vipshop Celebrates Completion of IPO and First Day of Trading on the NYSE, NYSE
(Mar. 23, 2012), http://www1.nyse.com/press/1332499674039.html; Autohome Inc.
Announces Pricing of Initial Public Offering, AUTOHOME INC. (Dec. 10, 2013), http://
ir.autohome.com.cn/phoenix.zhtml?c=250722&p=irol-newsArticle_print&ID=1883777;
Qunar Cayman Islands Limited, Qunar Announces Pricing of Initial Public Offering,
GLOBE NEWSWIRE (Nov. 1, 2013), http://globenewswire.com/news-release/2013/11/01/
585921/10055716/en/Qunar-announces-Pricing-of-Initial-Public-Offering.html; Katie
Roof, China’s JD.com Rallies in Nasdaq Debut, FOX BUSINESS (May 22, 2014), http://www
.foxbusiness.com/industries/2014/05/22/china-jdcom-set-for-nasdaq-debut/.
3. See Xu Ping, Variable Interest Entity (VIE) Structure for Foreign Investment in the
PRC May Face Challenge, CHINA LAW INSIGHT (Oct. 20, 2011), http://www.chinalawin
sight.com/2011/10/articles/corporate/foreign-investment/variable-interest-entity-viestructure-for-foreign-investment-in-the-prc-may-face-challenge/ (detailing how the VIE
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doubts have accumulated over the validity and viability of the VIE, and
some scholars have reported fierce battles with respect to control over
VIEs.4 This Article aims to delve deeper into the VIE phenomenon and
calls for the relevant parties to realign their interests and engineer a healthy
and equitable investment regulatory mechanism.
Part I briefly describes the concept and accounting treatments of the
VIE in the U.S. and the rise and exuberance of the VIE in China. The
creative and even odd combination of these two foreshadows the current
predicament of the VIE structure. Part II introduces the parties and components of the Chinese-styled VIE, which work together to serve the purpose of the VIE structure. The three parts that follow detail the factors
contributing to the ongoing trouble encumbering the VIE in China. Part III
explores the unfavorable regulatory interventions stemming from different
authorities, including the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) and the
China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) as well as regional governments. Part IV presents briefs on representative cases like Giga Media,
Anbow Education, Alibaba, and New Oriental Education to demonstrate
the de facto and potential risks concerning the breach of contracts and control over VIEs. Part ? analyzes recent Shanghai CIETAC arbitration decisions and the Chinachem case adjudicated by the Chinese Supreme
People’s Court, both of which interpret the controversy surrounding VIE
agreements. Part VI focuses on the responses by Hong Kong and U.S.
securities regulators to the above-mentioned developments. Finally, Part
VII explains the logic of the VIE’s evolution and proposes a new regulatory
framework and action plan for it.
I. Chinese Wine in the American Bottle
A. The Concept of the VIE in the U.S.
The term “Variable Interest Entity” has its origins in American
accounting rules, namely the Financial Accounting Standards Board
(FASB)’s Interpretation No. 46, Consolidation of Variable Interest Entities
(FIN 46).5 FIN 46 was promulgated in 2003 to expand on the interpretation of Accounting Research Bulletin (ARB) 51.6 Under ARB 51, a parent
company was to consolidate its subsidiary if it had a “controlling financial
interest.”7 A controlling financial interest was present if the parent comstructure enables domestic companies in China to list their companies overseas and
obtain financing from overseas markets while circumventing the approval requirements
created by the People’s Republic of China in the M&A rules).
4. See Serena Y. Shi, Comment, Dragon’s House of Cards: Perils of Investing in Variable Interest Entities Domiciled in the People’s Republic of China and Listed in the United
States, 37 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1265, 1268, 1291 (2014).
5. Project Updates, Reconsideration of FIN 46(R) Consolidation of Variable Interest
Entities, (June 18, 2009), http://www.fasb.org/jsp/FASB/FASBContent_C/ProjectUpdate
Page&cid=900000011143. FIN 46 was issued in January 2003. It was subsequently
revised and replaced by FIN 46R in December 2003.
6. Id.
7. Id.
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pany had a majority of the voting interest (the voting interest principle).
The standard reads:
The usual condition for a controlling financial interest is ownership of a
majority voting interest, and, therefore, as a general rule ownership by one
company, directly or indirectly, of over fifty percent of the outstanding voting shares of another company is a condition pointing toward consolidation.
However, there are exceptions to this general rule. A majority-owned subsidiary shall not be consolidated if control does not rest with the majority
owner (as, for instance, if the subsidiary is in legal reorganization or in
bankruptcy or operates under foreign exchange restrictions, controls, or
other governmentally imposed uncertainties so severe that they cast significant doubt on the parent’s ability to control the subsidiary).8

FIN 46, however, amended how certain legal entities, formerly known as
“Special Purpose Entities” (SPEs),9 should be consolidated in financial
statements. FIN 46 was promulgated in response to the outrage over offbalance sheet activities following the Enron scandal.10 SPEs are business
entities formed for the purpose of conducting a single prescribed activity,
including risk sharing among investors and isolation of the company from
its project risk and securitization.11 Although SPEs were mostly used for
legitimate business purposes, inadequate accounting guidance in this area
allowed some companies to manipulate their financial statements to hide
losses and fabricate earnings. Companies achieved this by structuring the
SPEs such that they were separate and unconsolidated entities.12
Under FIN 46 (which was reissued as FIN 46R), however, the voting
interests principle under ARB 51 is no longer the sole determinant of “controlling financial interests” where SPEs are concerned.13 Now, there is a
two-stage process. First, the entity must be considered a VIE;14 if so, then it
will be consolidated if the “parent” (or primary beneficiary) is exposed to
the majority risk of the entity/VIE’s returns and losses (the risk and
rewards principle).
8. ARB 51: Consolidated Financial Statements, FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS
BOARD (Aug. 1959), available at http://www.fasb.org/cs/BlobServer?blobcol=urldata&
blobtable=MungoBlobs&blobkey=id&blobwhere=1175820901468&blobheader=appli
cation%2Fpdf.
9. SPEs are also known as “Special Purpose Vehicles” (SPVs) or “Financial Vehicle
Corporations” (FVCs) in some places. Arlette Wilson & Jefferson Jones, New Accounting
Guidelines for Variable Interest Entities: Will the New Rules Reduce the Risk?, 5 J. RISK FIN.
54, 54 (2004); Reimund Mink, Classification and Terminology of Financial Corporations
in the Updated SNA, 16 (2006), presented at the Fourth Meeting of the Advisory Expert
Group on National Accounts, Frankfurt, Germany, Jan. 30 - Feb. 8, 2006, available at
https://unstats.un.org/unsd/nationalaccount/aeg/papers/m4Liabilities.pdf.
10. Wilson & Jones, supra note 9, at 54.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 54-55.
13. Project Updates, supra note 5.
14. Jenny Li Zhang, Economic Consequences of Recognizing Off-Balance Sheet
Activities, 6 (Jan. 5, 2009) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Washington),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1266456.
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Figure 1: The Test for VIE Structure15
Step 1: Is the entity a VIE?
No

Yes

Apply ARB 51: base
consolidation on
majority votes

Step 2: Is there a primary
beneficiary based on
majority risk?
No

No consolidation, every party
uses the equity method

Yes
The primary beneficiary
consolidate the VIE

• In the first stage, an entity is considered a VIE under FIN 46R if it possesses one or more of the following characteristics:16
• It is thinly capitalized. That is, it does not have sufficient equity investment at risk;
• The residual equity holders do not control the entity;
• Equity holders do not participate fully in an entity’s residual economics
(returns and losses); or
• The entity was established with non-substantive voting interests.

In the second stage, the question then becomes, who is the “primary beneficiary”? The primary beneficiary is the entity which, by the risk and
rewards principle, is exposed to the majority of the expected losses. If no
party takes the majority of the expected losses, then “the party which is
entitled to the majority rewards of the VIE is the primary beneficiary.”17
B. VIEs Rise in China18
VIEs in the People’s Republic of China (China or the PRC), however,
are essentially investment vehicles— the result of an amalgamation of various contractual arrangements and undertakings that try to establish control and quasi “ownership” over an entity without the use of direct equity
ownership.19 The model shown in Figure 2 was first used by the internet
15. Id.
16. Umit G. Gurun, Alina Lerman, & Joshua Ronen, Anticipatory and Implementation Effects of Fin 46 on the Behavior of Different Market Participants, 5-6 (June 15, 2009),
available at http://faculty.som.yale.edu/alinalerman/documents/GurunLermanRonen
.pdf; Sic-12 and Fin 46R – The Substance of Control, PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS,19
(2004), available at http://www.pwc.com/gx/en/ifrs-reporting/pdf/sic12_fin46r.pdf.
17. Zhang, supra note 14, at 7.
18. For a more detailed description about VIE structures in China, see David
Schindelheim, Variable Interest Entity Structures in the People’s Republic of China: Is
Uncertainty for Foreign Investors Part of China’s Economic Development Plan? 21 CARDOZO
J. INT’L & COMP. L. 195 (2012).
19. See id. at 198.
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company Sina.com in 2000 for its listing on NASDAQ.20
Figure 2: A Typical VIE Structure21
Founders, Cornerstone or
Public Shareholders, etc.

Listed Company (ListCo)
(e.g., Cayman Islands)
Foreign
Intermediaries
(HK, Cayman Islands, etc.)

China

contracts

Wholly Foreign Owned
Enterprise (WFOE) (PRC)

contracts

Founders/Partners or
Individuals
(Natural Person) (PRC)

Operating Company
(OpCo /VIE) (PRC)

The historical and perhaps main reason for using VIEs in China is to
avoid the restrictions on foreign direct ownership and investment in specific Chinese industries.22 The Catalogue for the Guidance of Foreign
Investment Industries (the Catalogue), a publication jointly issued by the
National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) and MOFCOM of
the PRC, delineates three broad categorizations of industries– those which
encouraged, restricted, and prohibited foreign investment.23 If a sector is
not mentioned in the Catalogue, foreign investment is generally “permit20. See Neil Gough, In China, Concern About a Chill on Foreign Investments, N.Y.
TIMES (June 2, 2013), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/06/02/in-china-concern-of-achill-on-foreign-investments/?_r=0.
21. Paul L. Gillis, Accounting Matters Variable Interest Entities in China, FORENSIC
ASIA, 1 (Sept. 18, 2012), available at http://www.chinaaccountingblog.com/vie2012septaccountingmatte.pdf, with editorial modification.
22. See Understanding the VIE Structure: Necessary Elements for Success and Legal
Risks Involved, CADWALADER, WICKERSHAM & TAFT LLP, 2 (Aug. 10, 2011), available at
http://www.cadwalader.com/resources/clients-friends-memos/understanding-the-viestructure-necessary-elements-for-success-and-the-legal-risks-involved [hereinafter Understanding the VIE Structure].
23. See MINISTRY OF COMMERCE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA,
[Catalogue for the Guidance of Foreign Investment Industries] (2011), available at http://
images.mofcom.gov.cn/wzs/accessory/201112/1325217903366.pdf. The English
translation, for reference only, is available at http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/poli
cyrelease/aaa/201203/20120308027837.shtml. Note that the 2011 Catalogue was further amended on May 1, 2013. Information on these amendments, in Chinese, is available at http://www.nnccpit.org/index.php?m=content&c=index&a=show&catid=19&id=
1281.
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ted.”24 By instituting the VIE structure, foreign investors are able to gain an
interest in restricted and prohibited industries, e.g. the internet and information technology sector.25 This is possible because the Listed Company
does not have any equity ownership in the Operating Company (VIE). For
Chinese domestic firms, the use of VIEs enables them to “gain access to
[foreign] capital markets through offshore listings.”26
The Chinese government’s enhanced regulation of equity acquisition
by foreign investors has substantially added to the popularity of using the
VIE structure. For a direct acquisition, the foreign investor acquires equity
in a Foreign Invested Enterprise (FIE) or domestic enterprise through an
existing foreign or Chinese equity holder pursuant to either (1) an equity
acquisition agreement or (2) a subscription for some new equity with the
target.27 In many cases, such “foreign investors” are offshore holding companies in which both Chinese residents and cornerstone foreign private
equity investors hold an interest.28 Over time, the Chinese government
became increasingly skeptical of such a practice, called “round trip investments,” which is often carried out in respect to an overseas listing pre-IPO
restructure.29
The Provisions on Mergers and Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises
by Foreign Investors (2006 M&A Rules), which became effective in September 2006, was promulgated jointly by MOFCOM, the State-owned Assets
Supervision Administrative Commission (SASAC), the State Administration of Taxation (SAT), the State Administration of Industry and Commerce (SAIC), the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) and
the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE).30 Under the 2006
M&A Rules, “[w]here a domestic company, enterprise or natural person
intends to take over its domestic affiliated company in the name of an overseas company which it lawfully established or controls, it shall be subject
24. See A Primer on Foreign Investment Structures & Special Development Zones in
China, CADWALADER, WICKERSHAM & TAFT LLP (June 27, 2011), available at http://www
.cadwalader.com/resources/clients-friends-memos/a-primer-on-foreign-investments-investment-structures-special-development-zones-in-china-3.
25. See Schindelheim, supra note 18, at 196, 226 (discussing, specifically the
internet sector).
26. Understanding the VIE Structure, supra note 22, at 1-2.
27. Peter Corne & Carl Hinze, The Current State of M&A in China, THE METROPOLITAN CORPORATE COUNSEL (Dec. 2007), available at http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/
pdf/2007/December/76.pdf.
28.
, ALL CHINA LAWYERS ASS’N (July 9, 2014), http://
www.acla.org.cn/html/lvshiwushi/20140709/17264.html.
29. See Howard Chao & Kaichen Xu, China’s Regulation of “Round Trip Investments”,
TOPICS IN CHINESE LAW, O’MELVENY & MYERS LLP (Jan. 2008), available at http://www
.omm.com/files/Publication/4cdb8217-4aa1-4ad7-9091-0130a5ea4528/Presentation/
PublicationAttachment/b76d9dbd-f240-43c2-b29b-01dcb3fd9928/TICLRoundTripIn
vestments.pdf.
30. See Kirkland & Ellis LLP, New Rules For Chinese Company M&A Transactions
Involving Foreign Investors, PRIVATE EQUITY NEWSLETTER, 3, n.1 (Sept. 1, 2006), available
at http://www.kirkland.com/siteFiles/Publications/2862933E994B6CCBC8390398627
0D0C5.pdf.
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to the examination and approval of the MOFCOM.”31 As a practical matter, MOFCOM and CSRC rarely approve such affiliated acquisitions and
they have also failed to release any workable guidelines on how to apply for
examination and approval of these acquisitions. Since VIEs do not involve
any equity acquisition, there is no need to obtain regulatory approval; this
allows VIEs to bypass the need to obtain approvals for cross-border acquisitions under the 2006 M&A Rules for cross-border acquisitions, which are
“notoriously difficult to obtain.”32
In 2009, China Qinfa (HKEx. 00866) went public in Hong Kong with
the VIE structure, a move that surprised many and potentially angered regulatory authorities.33 Unlike those emerging asset-light companies, Qinfa
is a traditional asset-heavy company that engages in the coal operation business.34 Through a VIE structure, Qinfa circumvented the 2006 M&A
Rules, foreign currency exchange regulations, and industry-admission policy. Even if the VIE might serve as a comfortable “excuse” for regulatory
authorities to acquiesce in the offshore financing and listing of emerging
asset-light companies, severe concerns arise about whether the VIE could
be acceptable in any other sector, especially a sector that encompasses
traditional asset-heavy companies like Qinfa.35
Through in-depth consideration, one could also find intrinsic irony
when Chinese executives, with help from investment bankers and lawyers,
wrack their brains to make use of the VIE to list their business overseas.
The essence of VIE treatment in the U.S. is substance over form; by searching for the primary beneficiary, it overcame the stark and oversimplified
shareholder criteria and was introduced to rein in rampant financial
reporting fraud and debt evasion.36 VIE treatment in the U.S. seems more
stringent and effective than many straightforward legal restrictions. In
contrast, VIE usage in China held high the tenet of free will and contractual
freedom, focusing on deed arrangements over equity investment with a real
31. Interim Provision on Mergers and Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign
Investors, MINISTRY OF COMMERCE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, art. 11 (Aug. 10, 2006),
http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/policyrelease/Businessregulations/201303/2013
0300045825.shtml.
32. Hai-Ching Yang, An Update on China’s Variable Interest Entities: Navigating Regulations and Mitigating Risks for 2013, K&L GATES, 2 (Mar. 8, 2013), available at http://
www.klgates.com/files/Publication/17f27e53-67f8-4438-9444-2c4aa401f933/Presenta
tion/PublicationAttachment/8b5055c4-f814-41e8-b3ec-95398f6e7708/Asia_Alert_3820
13.pdf.
33. Cristiano Rizzi, A Review and Outlook of VIE (Variable Interest Entity) and Other
Related Issues: an Introduction, CHINA BLAWG (June 17, 2013), http://blawg.lehmanlaw
.com/wordpress/?p=1905.
34. See generally Company Profile, QINFA GROUP , http://www.qinfagroup.com/en/
About%20us.html (last visited Nov. 26, 2014).
35. See Steve Xiang, Anthony Wang & Wenfeng Li, Chinese Government Urged to
Regulate Popular Foreign Investment Structure, ASIA ALERT, WEIL, GOTSHAL & MANGES LLP,
2-4 (Oct. 2011), available at http://www.weil.com/~/media/files/pdfs/October_2011_
Asia_Alert_Corrected.pdf.
36. See FASB Interpretation No. 46 (revised December 2003) FIN46(R)-3, FINANCIAL
ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD, (2008), available at http://www.fasb.org/jsp/FASB/Doc
ument_C/DocumentPage?cid=1175801627792&acceptedDisclaimer=true.
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hope to circumvent government restrictions and regulations; in other
words, form over substance.37 The grotesque combination of these two
approaches is too manipulative in nature and, as a result, doomed to face
challenges.
II. Chinese Style VIE: Parties and Components
Given the abovementioned background, it is best to define the parties
in a Chinese-styled VIE structure and explain how such a structure is
achieved.
A. The Parties
The entities typically involved in VIEs are the listed entity (ListCo) and
its intermediaries,38 which own the Wholly Foreign Owned Enterprise
(WFOE), along with the Chinese operating entity (OpCo or VIE) and its
legal owner, which is a Chinese national (Chinese Partners/Founders).
(a) The ListCo and its Intermediaries. The ListCo is usually incorporated in offshore jurisdictions, like the Cayman Islands or the British Virgin Islands, but incorporation in onshore jurisdictions, like the United
States, is not uncommon. The ListCo serves merely as a holding company,
and therefore typically does not have any operations. The intermediaries
(if any) are typically incorporated in Hong Kong as well as offshore jurisdictions. These are usually incorporated to avoid a withholding tax on dividends, but Chinese rules make this implausible.
(b) The WFOE. The WFOE is incorporated in the PRC by either the
ListCo or its wholly-owned intermediaries prior to listing. WFOEs are
heavily regulated, and are required to only pursue businesses that are
within the ambit of its business license.39 For the purposes of the VIE, the
WFOE will often obtain a license that will allow it to conduct a consulting
business with the OpCo as its only customer.40
It should be noted, however, that in industries where ownership is not
restricted or prohibited, the multinational may conduct all its operations
37. See China VIE Structure for Foreign Investment Under Attack from Multiple Directions: Will it Emerge (Relatively) Unscathed or Is its Very Survival Threatened?, HOGAN
LOVELLS LLP, 1-3 (Jan. 2012), available at http://www.hoganlovells.com/files/Publication/7acf9f60-c4d8-4363-aa1c-9b76af0cdd0d/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/92f
53946-f08c-4125-9dc7-a43946eb8b2b/Hogan_Lovells_Client_Note_-_China_VIE_Struc
ture_for_Foreign_Investment_Under_Attac.pdf.
38. Though it is not technically correct to term the intermediaries as “ListCo,” the
ListCo often wholly owns these intermediaries. Thus, for the purposes of this paper
(and for simplicity), unless stated otherwise, they will be treated as being one and the
same.
39. See The Canadian Trade Commissioner Service, Establishing a Wholly ForeignOwned Enterprise in China. THE CANADIAN TRADE COMMISSIONER SERVICE, (2014), http://
www.tradecommissioner.gc.ca/eng/document.jsp?did=132208.
40. See David Roberts & Thomas Hall, VIE Structures in China: What You Need to
Know, TOPICS IN CHINESE LAW, 2-3 (Oct. 2011), available at http://iis-db.stanford.edu/
evnts/6963/TICL_-_VIE_Structures_in_China.pdf.
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through a WFOE, without the need for a VIE structure.41
(c) The OpCo and Chinese Partner. The OpCo is owned by the Chinese
Partner. The Chinese Partner is typically a founder or co-founder, the
chairman of the ListCo, or a trusted employee or partner who is a Chinese
citizen.42 By having Chinese-only ownership, the OpCo is able to operate
in industries that prohibit or restrict foreign ownership.43 In effect, the
OpCo is the license holder and, more importantly, the source of benefits
and losses under a VIE structure.
B. Achieving the Structure
As shown in Figure 2, various contracts are signed between the OpCo
and WFOE to mimic the effect of equity ownership. These include:
(a) Loan agreement. The loan agreement deals with capitalizing the
OpCo and obtaining security for the loan that is used for that capitalization. The loan that is usually given by the WFOE to the Chinese Partner is
“an RMB denominated, interest free loan running for a number of years
with the potential for extension.”44 In return the Chinese Partner pledges
his/her equity in the OpCo as security for breach of the loan agreement.45
One problem here deserves particular attention: although the loan from
the WFOE would bypass potential problems with the State Administration
of Foreign Exchange,46 the WFOE’s constituent documents must give it the
legal capacity to make the loan to begin with; otherwise, the actions of the
WFOE would be ultra vires and void.
(b) Equity pledge agreement. The equity pledge, as mentioned above,
acts as security for the loan extended by the WFOE to the Chinese Partner;
however, under Chinese law, security interests must be registered with relevant Chinese authorities before it can be perfected.47 Failure to do so may
result in unenforceability.
(c) Call option agreement. The call option gives the WFOE the legal
right to purchase the OpCo’s shares from the Chinese Partner at a predetermined price; this is either based on the quantum of the loan extended by
the WFOE to the Chinese Partners or on the “lowest permissible price
41. See generally Gillis, supra note 21.
42. Id. at 5.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. See id. at 6.
46. Cf. the ListCo, which as an offshore public company, would have attracted regulatory scrutiny from SAFE, and also impinged upon rules restricting foreign acquisitions
if it were used instead of the WFOE. See also Rocky T. Lee, China: SAFE Regulations
Affecting Inbound And Outbound Payments In Cross-Border M&A Transactions Within The
People’s Republic Of China, MONDAQ (Sept. 26, 2011), http://www.mondaq.com/x/1465
88/Mergers+Acquisitions/SAFE+Regulations+Affecting+Inbound+And+Outbound+Pay
ments+In+CrossBorder+MA+Transactions+Within+The+Peoples+Republic+Of+China.
47. See Ensuring Creditor Protection in Asia Pacific Construction Projects, DLA PIPER
(2013), available at http://www.dlapiper.com/~/media/Files/Insights/Publications/
2013/02/Ensuring%20creditor%20protection%20in%20construction%20pro__/Files/
propertysecuritieslawasiapacific/FileAttachment/propertysecuritieslawasiapacific.pdf.
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under PRC law.”48 However, the option is more for comfort than actual
protection since it underscores the very reason why the WFOE cannot own
the OpCo, i.e. because the OpCo lies in an industry that prohibits or
restricts foreign investment. Thus, it is best for the ListCo to transfer the
shares to another Chinese national (and come up with a new set of
arrangements vis-à-vis the latter).
(d) Power of attorney. The Chinese Partners also typically give the
WFOE power of attorney. This assigns to the WFOE all of the usual shareholder rights, including voting, attending shareholder meetings, and acting
as necessary to execute the call option agreement.
(e) Technical service agreement and asset licensing agreement. The technical service agreement(s) give(s) the WFOE the right to the OpCo’s
residual profits in return for its (the WFOE’s) exclusive provision of technical services to the VIE. These ‘services’ differ between industries and companies but “often include website maintenance, programming, sales
support, fulfillment services, curriculum development, etc.”49 The WFOE
also exerts indirect controls on the VIE through “negative and affirmative
covenants in the technical consulting services agreement covering matters
such as segregated dual-signature bank accounts, minimum QOS [(Quality
of Services)] standards, systems design and operational management
requirements, on-site training and supervision, management outsourcing
arrangements, etc.”50
Some variations can exist between VIE structures. For example, many
WFOEs do not extract all of the OpCo’s profits through service agreements. Moreover, in some cases, an additional asset licensing agreement is
used, whereby the WFOE licenses certain assets, typically intellectual property, to the OpCo in return for royalty fees.
All in all, ‘ownership’ and control is achieved from contracts.51 However, the viability of the listing depends on the fundamental requirement
that the OpCo’s financials are consolidated with that of the ListCo; this
requirement allows the ListCo to generate interest in its listing.52 The use
of consolidation to attract funds, however, is not a new notion; the United
States Steel Corporation used this tactic for the very same purpose in 1902.
United States Steel likely recognized the value of this tactic because
“[c]onsolidated balance sheets might have provided a more impressive picture of the security which would be offered [to] prospective bond holders
at a time when the corporation’s management was becoming aware of a
48. Gillis, supra note 21, at 6.
49. Id.
50. Robert Lewis, China Watch: A Foreign Lawyer’s View from the Inside, THE LAWYER
(Oct. 19, 2011), http://www.thelawyer.com/china-watch-a-foreign-lawyers-view-fromthe-inside/1009862.article.
51. See Stacey P. Slaughter, China’s Forbidden Investment: Emerging Legal Risks for
Investors Who Deal with Chinese Variable Interest Entity (VIE) Structures, ROBINS, KAPLAN,
MILLER & CIRESI L.L.P. (Mar. 1, 2012), http://www.rkmc.com/resources/articles/chinas-forbidden-investment.
52. See Gillis, supra note 21, at 1, 3 (discussing how Chinese company are consolidated into the financial statements of the offshore parent companies).
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need to go to the market for additional working capital.”53
That said, the key rationales for consolidation in the beginning of the
twentieth century were the “need to avoid misrepresentations of liquidity,
or to ensure that readers were aware of the resources to which funds had
been directed, or to reflect the position of an ‘economic entity.’ ”54This was
due, in part, to the concept of the holding company being popularized in
order to allow companies to bypass the problems associated with amalgamations in the U.S.55
Unlike ownership in consolidated companies over 100 years ago, ownership in VIEs is not equity-based.56 Rather, it is based on contractual
ownership that mimics equity ownership.57 For VIEs, then, the ListCo is
effectively suggesting to shareholders and securities regulators that
although contractual ‘ownership’ is different in form from equity ownership, the two are in substance the same.58 However, there has been
increasing evidence that the VIEs’ legal substance is different from the economic substance, or at best, has a tenuous semblance. Three threats
emerged from government regulatory interference, illustrating this tenuous
connection between VIEs’ legal and economic substance: willful breach of
contracts, disputes over control, and unfavorable judiciary and arbitration
decisions.59
III. Government Regulatory Interference
A. Other Agencies and Local Governments
The first clouds of regulatory interference in VIE management actually
came from peripheral agencies. For example, in July 2006, the Ministry of
Information Industries, which was then integrated into the Ministry of
Industry and Information Technology (MIIT), released a notice document
entitled “Strengthening the Administration of Foreign Investment Valueadded Telecommunications Services” (Notice).60 Value-added telecommunications services, which are highly regulated in China, include online
data processing and Internet access services that regularly employed the
53. R. G. WALKER, CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS: A HISTORY AND ANALYSIS 153 (1978).
54. Id. at 220.
55. Id. at 261.
56. Yang, supra note 32, at 1.
57. Duane Lawrence, China Companies Evading Rule With U.S. Listings Stump Regulators, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 9, 2011, 5:00 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-1009/china-companies-evading-rule-with-u-s-listings-stump-regulators.html.
58. While it is acknowledged that the ListCo does disclose that there are regulatory
risks etc., this is essentially the underlying premise by which they are listing. See, eg.,
Carbonite, Inc., Form 10-K Annual Report, Carbonite, Inc., (Mar. 7, 2012), available at
http://investor.carbonite.com/secfiling.cfm?filingID=1193125-12-101462.
59. See infra Part IV and V of this paper.
60. Notice of the Ministry of Information Industry on Strengthening the Administration
of Foreign Investment in Value-added Telecommunications Services, MINISTRY OF COMMERCE
(July 13, 2006), http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/policyrelease/announcement/
200712/20071205275842.html.
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VIE structure.61 Without mentioning the VIE structure explicitly, the
Notice called for “an immediate stop of unauthorized foreign investors providing VAT service in China and prohibits domestic telecom companies
from leasing, transferring or selling telecom business operation licenses in
any form to foreign investors.”62
A more explicit government agency rule which targeted the VIE structure appeared in September 2009. The General Administration of Press
and Publication (GAPP), the National Copyright Administration (NCA),
and the National Office of Combating Pornography and Illegal Publications jointly issued a document entitled, “The Notice Regarding the Consistent Implementation of the ‘Stipulations on Three Provisions’ of the State
Council and the Relevant Interpretations of the State Commission Office
for Public Sector Reform and the Further Strengthening of the Administration of Pre-examination and Approval of Internet Games and the Examination and Approval of Imported Internet Games” (2009 GAPP Notice).63
The 2009 GAPP Notice “expressly prohibits foreign investors from using
contractual or other control arrangements to gain control over domestic
Internet game operators.”64 However, the agencies issuing the 2009 GAPP
Notice did not include MOFCOM, MIIT, or the Ministry of Culture, and the
absence of these powerful administrations cast doubt on the Notice’s influence.65 For example, Taomee Holdings Limited, a company that operated
through a VIE structure, listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) in
June 2011.66
Chinese local governments also joined the chorus of skepticism. In
September 2010, Buddha Steel filed a registration statement for an initial
public offering in the United States. The registration statement disclosed
the company’s VIE arrangement, which allowed Buddha Steel to exert control over and reap all of the economic benefits from a steel company

61. Sector Primers— Internet, ORRICK, HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE LLP, 2 (Feb. 2012),
available at http://www.orrick.com/Events-and-Publications/Documents/4521.pdf.
62. David Huang, China Imposes Stricter Regulations on Foreign Invested Internet and
Telecom Businesses, DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP (Aug. 2006), http://www.dorsey.com/
china_report_aug_2006/.
63. See, e.g., Email from Guantao Law Firm to China Mobile Games and Entertainment
Group Limited, GUANTAO LAW FIRM (HONG KONG) (Aug. 27, 2012), available at http://
www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1528752/000104746912008541/a2210847zex-99_
7.htm.
64. Paul McKenzie, GAPP Issues Notice Further Restricting Foreign Participation in
China’s Internet Gaming Industry, MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP, 1 (Oct. 16, 2009), available at http://www.mofo.com/~/media/Files/Resources/Publications/2009/10/GAPP%
20Issues%20Notice%20Further%20Restricting%20Foreign%20P__/Files/091016GAPP
Regulations/FileAttachment/091016GAPPRegulations.pdf.
65. David Roberts, O’Melveny & Myers Publishes Paper on VIE Structures in China:
What You Need to Know, O’MELVENY & MYERS LLP (Nov. 1, 2011), http://www.omm
.com/fcwsite/abc.aspx?url=newsroom%2fpenPDF.aspx%3fpub%3d1167.
66. Taomee Holdings Limited, Prospectus Filed Pursuant to Rule 424(b)(4), (June
10, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1507051/00011931
2511162606/d424b4.htm.
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located in Hebei province.67 In March 2011, local government authorities
in Hebei province notified the OpCo that the VIE agreements “ ‘contravene
current Chinese management policies related to foreign-invested enterprises and are against public policy.’ ”68 To avoid legal action, Buddha
Steel therefore had to quickly request that its SEC filing be withdrawn.
Although some lawyers interpreted this behavior as “a ‘one off’ event motivated by facts peculiar to this situation[,]”69 the apparent regional veto on
VIE arrangements did cast new doubt, adding another layer of complexity
to the VIE situation.
B. MOFCOM and CSRC
Probably the most worrisome indications of increasing regulatory
control over VIEs came from MOFCOM, which addressed the VIE structure
in general rather than targeting specific industry sectors. In March 2011,
the General Office of the PRC State Council issued the Notice on the Establishment of the Security Review System for Mergers and Acquisitions of
Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors.70 Subsequently, MOFCOM
promulgated an implementing rule: “Regulation on Implementing of the
Security Review System for Mergers and Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors” (Provisions), on August 25, 2011, which went
into effect on September 1, 2011.71 Article 9 of the Provisions specifically
emphasized that “security review [will be] based on the essential content
and actual impact of the transaction . . . .[and that a] [f]oreign [investor]
shall not avoid M&A security review through any means, including . . .
contractual control.”72
It should be noted that not all M&A transactions will trigger a security
review. The security review process only applies if the target domestic
67. Buddha Steel, Inc., Form S-1 Registration Statement, 1 (Sept. 17, 2010), available
at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1367777/000114420410049933/
v196530_s1.htm.
68. Thomas M. Shoesmith, Client Alert: PRC Challenge to Variable Interest Entity
Structures?, PILLSBURY WINTHROP SHAW PITTMAN LLP, 2 (Mar. 31, 2011), available at
http://www.pillsburylaw.com/siteFiles/Publications/ChinaAlertPRCChallengetoVIEStructures_03_31_11pdf.pdf.
69. Id.
70. GuoWuYuan BanGong Ting GuanYu JianLi WaiGuo TouZi Zhe BingGuo JingNei
QiYe AnQuan ShenCha ZhiDu de TongZhi
(
) [Circular of the
General Office of the State Council on the Establishment of Security Review System
Regarding Merger and Acquisition of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors]
(promulgated by the General Office of the State Council, Feb. 3, 2011, effective Feb. 3,
2011) 6 GUO BAN FA, available at http://www.fdi.gov.cn/1800000121_39_57_0_7.html.
71. China Formalises National Security Review System for M&A Transactions by Foreign Investors, MWE CHINA LAW OFFICES (Sept. 16, 2011), http://www.mwechinalaw
.com/news/2011/chinalawalert0911c.htm [hereinafter China Formalises National Security Review System].
72. Announcement No. 53 of 2011 of the Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic
of China Concerning the Provisions of the Ministry of Commerce for the Implementation of
the Security Review System for Merger and Acquisition of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign
Investors, MINISTRY OF COMMERCE, art. 9 (Sept. 8, 2011), http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/
aarticle/policyrelease/domesticpolicy/201112/20111207869355.html.
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entity is involved in a business that concerns either national defense security issues or national economic security issues.73 The former includes military industry enterprises and supporting enterprises; enterprises adjacent
to major and sensitive military facilities; and other entities relevant to the
national security of China.74 The latter refers to entities that are involved
in major agricultural products, major natural resources and energy industries, important infrastructure projects, transportation services, key technologies, and major equipment that is related to national security.75
MOFCOM has five business days to decide whether the Merger or Acquisition requires national review, but if it decides against a national security
review, a designated list of bodies may request that the transaction still
undergo a national security review.76
MOFCOM also scrutinizes antitrust aspects of the VIE structure. A
researcher found in late 2012 that MOFCOM “issued a decision on the
conditional anti-monopoly approval of Walmart’s acquisition of Yihaodian
[(Store No.1)], a major China online retailer, which expressly preclude[d]
Walmart from engaging in value-added telecommunications business services currently provided by Yihaodian via the VIE structure.”77 The
researcher notes, “[t]his [was] the first time that the [MOFCOM] explicitly
prohibited the use of a VIE structure . . . [and] was concerned over
WalMart getting access to the restricted [value-added telecommunication
business] without obtaining the requisite regulatory approval.”78 A greater
general concern was that MOFCOM essentially equated foreign control and
bearing of economic outcome through the use of the VIE structure with
foreign ownership itself. Even if the VIE structure was narrowly interpreted, those dependent upon those structures would feel precarious if
they ever were in front of MOFCOM for an antitrust review.79 In other
words, if their company is VIE dependent, foreign investors have to re-evaluate their exit strategy because the sale of their company to strategic buyers
would trigger MOFCOM’s antitrust review.
The CSRC was the other key regulator that espoused an increasingly
adverse attitude concerning usage of the VIE structure. In September
2011, various media outlets published articles regarding an unofficial
internal report written by the CSRC staff that attracted a lot of attention
from VIE investors. The report supposedly suggested that the VIE poses a
major threat to China’s national security, and thus, urged MOFCOM to
73.
74.
75.
76.

See China Formalises National Security Review System, supra note 71.
See id.
Id.
Dawn Bernd-Schulz, Latest Developments in M&A Laws and Regulations in China,
BLANK ROME LLP, 14 (Nov. 2011), available at http://www.blankrome.com/sitefiles/
ChineseMALaws.pdf.
77. Daniel Dusek et al., China M&A: Looking Ahead to 2013, SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE,
MEAGHER & FLOM LLP & AFFILIATES, 116 (Jan. 2013), available at https://www.skadden
.com/sites/default/files/publications/Skadden_2013_Insights_Global_M-A.pdf.
78. Id.
79. Yingxi Fu-Tomlinson & Niping Wu, What the Future Holds for China’s VIE, INT’L
FIN. L. REV. (Sept. 25, 2012), http://www.iflr.com/Article/3093966/What-the-futureholds-for-Chinas-VIE.html.
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take the lead in enforcing regulations.80 The report also recommended
that all existing companies using the VIE structure be subject to approval
by MOFCOM and the CSRC when they list overseas.81 This proposal
would restrict and regulate new listings rather than existing ones. The
report observed that while the general regulatory requirements were in
place for years, enforcement has been inconsistent and many such requirements in fact have been widely avoided through the use of VIE structures.
Hence, it has been suggested that these approvals occur in collaboration
with the United States Security Exchange Commission (SEC), so that the
applicants would be reviewed before the actual listing occurs.82 The report
also recommended that Chinese Internet companies be encouraged to list
domestically, and that the use of VIE structures be discouraged.83
It remains unclear if this CSRC Report has been officially accepted by
the State Council. But, it appears that the Chinese government is increasingly concerned by the usage of VIE structures to circumvent foreign direct
investment restrictions in certain sectors and to avoid obtaining permission to list offshore. Recently, the CSRC issued a rule regarding the application process for overseas listing by PRC enterprises which sheds light on
the fate of the VIE (Circular 45).84 Circular 45 allowed joint stock limited
companies to apply with the CSRC to list overseas provided that the company meets listing requirements.85 However, such an application will be
denied “if one of its shareholders [are] invested in the issuer through a VIE
structure.”86 Hence, if the joint stock limited company is part of a VIE
structure, it will be denied by the CSRC. The CSRC is trying to make it
easier for domestic enterprises to list overseas, while discouraging companies from using the VIE structure.
IV. Breach of Contracts and Dispute over Control
Another vulnerability of the VIE structure lies in the conflict of interests between parties. The VIE structure might collapse if and when the
legal owner of the OpCo moves to take the company back and breaches the
VIE agreements. Normally, however, that is unlikely to happen because the
legal owner of the OpCo is also the majority shareholder and typically the
CEO of the ListCo. However, if such a legal owner and/or shareholder was
forced out of the ListCo, or if another substantial business change occurs
externally, the VIE tie would probably be broken.87 Then, the contractual
arrangements may prove to be less reliable than having direct ownership of
the OpCo.88
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Bernd-Schulz, supra note 76, at 24.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Yang, supra note 32, at 3.
Id. at 3-4.
Id. at 4.
See infra Part IV and V of this paper.
See id.
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A. Giga Media
The first case concerning conflicts of interest and breach of contracts
involved Giga Media Limited (Giga Media), which was incorporated in Singapore as a company limited by shares on September 13, 1999.89 Headquartered in Taibei, Giga Media mainly provided online games and cloud
computing services.90 Giga Media operated their Asian online game and
service business in the PRC through three VIEs until June 30, 2010, when
the PRC issued restrictions on foreign equity ownership of companies providing Internet content services as well certain other licensing restrictions.91 These VIEs held the PRC licenses required for the operation and
service business, and were all owned by PRC nationals.92
Ji Wang was the former head of the company’s Asian online game and
service business in the PRC, and the former CEO of T2CN, the WOFE that
has a contractual relationship with the OpCos. In early 2010, Giga Media
decided to remove Wang from his post as operating head to a less important position, which Wang did not accept; the conflict escalated later when
the company fired Wang. The company seals, financial seals (chops) and
business registration certificates, documents, records, data and tangible
property— including license agreements, trademarks and domain name
documentation— held in the offices of T2CN were missing. Lacking access
to these documents due to the dispute with Wang, Giga Media could not
obtain the financial information necessary to report the financial results of
T2CN. Somewhat fortunately in this case, however, the VIE structure in
the PRC only accounted for about 20% of Giga Media’s income. Thus, the
ListCo survived by deconsolidating T2CN’s results, which took effect on
July 1, 2010.93
B. Ambow Education
Another, though more chaotic case, involved Ambow Education Holding Ltd. (Ambow Education), a leading provider of educational and career
enhancement services in China. The CEO, Dr. Jin Huang, established
Ambow Education in 2000.94 It went public on the New York Stock
Exchange on August 5, 2010.95 Ambow Education was registered in the
89. GigaMedia Ltd., Annual Report (Form 20-F), 49 (June 30, 2011), available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1105101/000095012311063164/c19286e20
vf.htm#C19286105.
90. GigaMedia Overview, GIGAMEDIA LTD., http://www.gigamedia.com.tw/Overview
.html (last visited Nov. 30, 2014).
91. GigaMedia Ltd., Annual Report (Form 20-F), supra note 89, at 49.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 50.
94. Ambow Educ. Holding Ltd., Registration Statement (Form F-1), 143 (July 14,
2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1494558/0001193125101
58771/df1.htm [hereinafter Ambow Educ. Holding Ltd., Registration Statement (Form
F-1)].
95. Ambow Educ. Holding Ltd., Exhibit 99.1 to Report of Foreign Issuer (Form 6-K),
UNITED STATE SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, 8 (Sept. 20, 2013), available at http://www.sec
.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1494558/000110465913071328/a13-20766_1ex99d1.htm
[hereinafter Ambow Educ. Holding Ltd., Exhibit 99.1].

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\47-3\CIN303.txt

586

unknown

Seq: 18

9-JAN-15

Cornell International Law Journal

14:37

Vol. 47

Cayman Islands in 2005 due to PRC regulatory restrictions on foreign
investment in the education sector— particularly for companies with services for students in grades one to twelve— and on Internet content businesses. Ambow conducted their business in China primarily through
contractual arrangements between Ambow Online, one of their whollyowned subsidiaries in China, and several domestic PRC companies
(OpCos) that were owned either by Ambow employees or by entities controlled by Ambow employees. The OpCos’ shareholders pledged their
respective equity interests and entrusted all of their rights to exercise voting
power over these OpCos to Ambow Online.96
On July 2, 2012, a former employee alleged certain financial improprieties and wrongful conduct by senior executives in connection with the
company’s 2008 acquisition of a training school in the PRC.97 The company’s audit committee initiated investigations, but no result was published afterwards.98 Worrying about the internal control of the company,
the third largest shareholder, GL Asia Mauritius II Cayman Limited (GLA),
filed a petition on April 23, 2012 in the Grand Court of the Cayman
Islands (Grand Court), the company’s jurisdiction of organization, to
request an order to “wind up” the company on a just and equitable basis.99
On March 15, 2013, the second largest shareholder of Ambow Education,
Baring Asia Private Equity Fund V, L.P. (Baring), sent out a “Going Private”
Proposal.100 Soon thereafter, all three members of the audit committee
resigned from the board, claiming they could not continue the investigation
as the CEO, Dr. Jin Huang, refused to resign. The company’s auditor and
the legal counsel for the audit committee also resigned,101 and the New
York Stock Exchange halted the company’s ADS trading on March 22,
2013.102 As a result of these unexpected events, Baring withdrew its
“going private” proposal.103
96. Ambow Educ. Holding Ltd., Registration Statement (Form F-1), supra note 94, at
148.
97. Ambow Educ. Holding Ltd., Report of Foreign Issuer (Form 6-K), (July 2012),
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1494558/000110465912047538/a12-15903
_16k.htm.
98. See Ambow Educ. Holding Ltd., Exhibit 99.1, supra note 95, at 28.
99. Press Release, Ambow Educ. Holding Ltd., Ambow Education Holding Ltd.
Responds to Shareholder Petition (May 6, 2013) (on file with SEC), available at http://
www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1494558/000110465913037349/a13-11619_1ex99
d1.htm.
100. Press Release, Ambow Educ. Holding Ltd., Ambow Education Holding Ltd.
Announces Receipt of “Going Private” Proposal; Resignation of Directors and Appointment of a New Director (Mar. 18, 2013), available at http://investors.ir.ambow.com/us/
AMBO/announce/60/EN/ambo0318_gACUj1yF2IC3.pdf.
101. Press Release, Ambow Educ. Holding Ltd., Ambow Education Holding Ltd.
Announces Resignation of Independent Auditor and Counsel to Audit Committee (Mar.
22, 2013), available at http://investors.ir.ambow.com/us/AMBO/announce/62/EN/
Ambow_Press_Release_re_Resignation_of_PWC_FHeDaJQLHfD3.pdf.
102. Ambow Educ. Holding Ltd., Exhibit 99.1, supra note 95, at 8.
103. Press Release, Ambow Educ. Holding Ltd., Ambow Education Holding Ltd.
Announces Withdrawal of Non-Binding Going Private Proposal (Mar. 26, 2013), available at http://investors.ir.ambow.com/us/AMBO/announce/63/EN/ambow0326_FMca3
BpuQeuI.pdf.
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On June 7, 2013, the Grand Court ordered Ambow Education into
Provisional Liquidation.104 Three days later, the court revised the order
and dismissed Ambow Education’s board of directors and empowered the
provisional liquidators to take control of the company’s books and records
and conduct the company’s business, thus ending the wrangling between
CEO Huang and external shareholders.105
The collapse of Ambow Education stems from the instability of the
VIE structure. From 2008 to May 31, 2010, it merged 24 schools, all of
which were controlled by VIE agreements.106 The consideration was paid
half by cash and half by shares in Ambow Education.107 Nonetheless, after
going public, the stock price was much lower than the expectation of the
merged schools, and the company refused the schools’ requests to turn
their stocks into tradable ADS.108 Conflicts of interest thus arose between
the founders of these merged schools and CEO Huang. In fact, the
employee that alleged certain financial improprieties and wrongful conduct was actually the founder of one of the merged schools, further complicating the conflicts; meanwhile, the founder of another merged school filed
lawsuits first to freeze the ownership transfer of the school, and then to
invalidate the VIE agreements.109
C. Alibaba Group
The most renowned episode so far was probably the dispute between
Alibaba and Yahoo, which exposed the risks associated with VIEs to the
world. Alibaba Group is an e-commerce global leader and the largest ecommerce company in China.110 It was founded in 1999 by Chairman
Jack Ma and 18 other partners.111 Yahoo! Inc. (a U.S. company) and
Softbank (a Japanese company) invested in Alibaba Group and became its
principal shareholders.112 Before 2009, the corporate group was structured
104. Press Release, Ambow Educ. Holding Ltd., Ambow Education Holding Ltd.
Announces Appointment of Joint Provisional Liquidators by The Grand Court Of The
Cayman Islands (June 10, 2013), available at http://investors.ir.ambow.com/us/AMBO/
announce/70/EN/Ambow_Press_release_re_Appointment_of_Joint_Provisional_Liquida
tors_aqNtcNIPC6rk.pdf.
105. Matthew Miller, Court Orders China’s Ambow into Provisional Liquidation,
REUTERS (June 11, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/11/ambo-liquida
tion-idUSL3N0EN1ID20130611.
106. Ambow Educ. Holding Ltd., Registration Statement (Form F-1), supra note 94, at
F-12 (stating that Ambow Education entered into 24 acquisitions in 2008 and 2009).
107. Xiaolong Cao, Ambow Education Saving Itself, NEW FINANCIAL VIEW (June 30,
2013), http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/gsnews/20130630/112915965368.shtml.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. See Leslie Picker, Alibaba Files for US Public Offering of E-Commerce Giant,
BLOOMBERG (May 7, 2014, 10:08 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-05-06/
alibaba-files-for-us-public-offering-of-e-commerce-giant.html.
111. Marc Lajoie et al., What Is Alibaba?, WALL ST. J., http://projects.wsj.com/
alibaba/ (last visited Oct. 18, 2014).
112. Yahoo! Inc. held about 40% of shares (together with its wholly-owned subsidiary
Yahoo! Hong Kong) and Softbank held about 30% of shares. Prospectus of Alibaba.com
Ltd. Global Offering, ALIBABA.COM LTD., 144 (Oct. 23, 2007), available at http://globaldoc
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through equity control.113 To expedite obtaining an essential regulatory
license, Alibaba Group transferred the ownership of Alibaba Group’s
online payment business, Alipay, to the Chinese domestic company Zhejiang Alibaba E-Commerce Co., the majority owner of which was Jack Ma.114
The consideration for Alipay was at a price much lower than market
value.115 Nevertheless, after this change in ownership, Alibaba Group still
controlled Alipay, via contractual method or the VIE structure. However, in
early 2011, Ma terminated the VIE arrangement.116 As a result, Alibaba
Group and Yahoo no longer retained control over Alipay, and the profits of
Alipay could no longer be reflected on Yahoo’s balance sheet. Alipay was
regarded as one of the most valuable investments Yahoo held and, consequently, Yahoo’s stock price dropped 9.8% the day after Yahoo disclosed
this information.117
Yahoo and Ma provided different accounts as to when Yahoo learned
about the termination of the VIE arrangement. Yahoo insisted that the
transaction occurred without the knowledge or approval of Alibaba
Group’s board of directors or shareholders.118 On the other hand, Ma
claimed that the board had discussed a solution for Alipay for more than
three years and the VIE arrangement was acquiesced.119 Nonetheless, it is
clear that Ma not only unilaterally halted the VIE agreement, but also that,
by the time of termination, Yahoo and Softbank had yet to receive
compensation.
Ma claimed that his purpose for restructuring Alipay, by unilaterally
terminating the VIE arrangement, was to ensure that Alipay obtained a
uments.morningstar.com/documentlibrary/document/45dda2cbefcb49dc.msdoc/
original.
113. Press Conference on Alipay, ZDNET (June 15, 2011), available at http://tech.163
.com/11/0615/01/76I66VUD000915BF.html [hereinafter ZDNET].
114. See Yahoo! Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), 8 (May 10, 2011), available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1011006/000119312511134295/d10q.htm.
115. See Loretta Chao & Amir Efrati, Yahoo’s China Feud Turns Ugly, Stock Falls, WALL
ST. J. (May 14, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240527487037308
04576321030705428022. Jack Ma explained that the price was an arrangement under
VIE structure. ZDNET, supra note 113.
116. See iChinaStock, Alibaba Group No Longer Controls Alipay Via VIE Structure, BUSINESS INSIDER (May 31, 2011, 1:22 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/alibaba-groupno-longer-controls-alipay-via-vie-structure-2011-6.
117. Jennifer Saba, Yahoo, Alibaba Partnership on the Rocks, REUTERS (May 11, 2011,
5:49 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/05/11/yahoo-alibaba-china_n_860805
.htm.
118. Steven Russolillo, Corporate News: Yahoo Not Told of Alibaba Move, WALL ST. J.
(May 13, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014240527487046819045
76319000833038480; Joseph Menn, Yahoo Says Alibaba Board Not Informed of Sale,
FINANCIAL TIMES (May 13, 2011, 1:23 AM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/159a1c107cf2-11e0-a7c7-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2sE3GFPQX.
119. Mark Lee, Alibaba’s Ma Says Yahoo, Softbank Were ‘Wrong’ About Alipay, BLOOMBERG (June 14, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-06-14/alibaba-s-ma-saysyahoo-softbank-were-wrong-about-alipay.html; Joy Shaw et al., China VIE Structure May
Hold Hidden Risks, FINANCIAL TIMES (Nov. 11, 2011, 12:27 AM), http://www.ft.com/intl/
cms/s/2/0a1e4d78-0bf6-11e1-9310-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3Fb4eGVSP.

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\47-3\CIN303.txt

2014

Chinese Style VIEs

unknown

Seq: 21

9-JAN-15

14:37

589

Third Party Payment Business License,120 which it received on May 26,
2011.121 Nevertheless, an apparent conflict of interest between Ma and the
principal shareholders of Alibaba Group remained evident. In 2005, Yahoo
sold its China operations to Alibaba Group in return for a 40% stake in
Alibaba.122 Since then, Yahoo’s web search empire has crumbled while
Alibaba Group is fast becoming a global force in wholesale e-commerce.123
Ma has tried several times, albeit to no avail, to negotiate a deal that would
allow Alibaba Group to buy back Yahoo’s stake in Alibaba.124
The VIE control over Alipay was weak, as demonstrated by the result.
Under the VIE structure that was implemented, Yahoo had no means to
preemptively restrict Ma, putting Yahoo and Softbank into a dilemma.125
Ultimately, Alibaba Group, Yahoo, and Softbank reached an agreement
regarding Alipay on July 29, 2011.126 The agreement was consistent with
the two agreed-upon principles established at the outset of the negotiations: (1) to structure the inter-company relationship between Alipay and
Taobao in such a way so as to preserve the value within Alibaba Group, and
(2) to provide that Alibaba Group is appropriately compensated for the
value of Alipay, including at least $2 billion and up to $6 billion in proceeds from an IPO of Alipay or other liquidity event.127
D. New Oriental Education
After the Alipay incident, almost any change in VIE arrangements led
to a strong, sometimes excessive, reaction in the market. Consider New
Oriental Education, which is the largest provider of private educational services in China. The company’s first school was established in Beijing in
120. According to the Administrative Measures for the Payment Services Provided by
Non-financial Institutions and its drafts, foreign-invested payment institutions will be
separately regulated. Consequently, Alipay was unlikely to obtain the license at the first
opportunity without restructuring. In addition, VIE structures face regulatory risks due
to the ambiguous attitude of regulatory authorities. See ZDNET, supra note 113.
121. See Huang Yuntao & Kelvin Soh, Alipay Gets Licence to Set up e-Payment System,
REUTERS (May 26, 2011, 6:40 AM), http://ca.reuters.com/article/technologyNews/
idCATRE74P26120110526.
122. David Barboza, Yahoo Is Paying $1 Billion For 40% Stake in Alibaba, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 11, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/11/technology/11yahoo.html?page
wanted=all.
123. Jeff Sommer, Yahoo’s Asian Lifeline, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 19, 2014), http://www
.nytimes.com/2014/01/19/technology/yahoos-asian-lifeline.html; Kathrin Hille &
Joseph Menn, Battle looms as Alibaba strains at Yahoo leash, FINANCIAL TIMES (Sept. 22,
2010, 6:09 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/106d6b50-c665-11df-9cda-00144feab
49a.html#axzz2sE3GFPQX.
124. Joseph Menn & Kathrin Hille, Dispute Saps Yahoo’s Hold over Alibaba, FINANCIAL
TIMES, (May 13, 2011, 11:45 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/0107b9ca-7d4b11e0-bc41-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2sE3GFPQX.
125. See Evelyn M. Rusli, Yahoo and Alibaba Resolve Dispute Over Alipay, N.Y. TIMES
(July 29, 2011), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/07/29/yahoo-and-alibaba-resolvealipay-dispute/.
126. Id.
127. Id.
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1993 by Michael Minhong Yu, the Chairman and CEO of the company.128
To facilitate foreign investment, they established an offshore holding company, New Oriental Education & Technology Group Inc. (New Oriental
Education or EDU).129 On September 7, 2006, EDU was listed on the New
York Stock Exchange.130 As Chinese law and regulations regarding the
education business have some special restrictions on foreign invested companies, EDU applied the VIE structure. At the time of listing, the ownership of New Oriental China (OpCo) was shared by eleven EDU employees
or shareholders.131 In the following years, with the exception of one shareholder, an entity controlled by Yu, all of the former, ultimate shareholders
of New Oriental China left the company.132 From December 2011 until
January 2012, New Oriental China changed its shareholding structure,
requesting that the ten former shareholders transfer all of their equity interests in New Oriental China, without consideration, to Beijing Century
Friendship Education Investment Co., Ltd. (Century Friendship), an entity
controlled by Yu.133
Such restructuring attracted the attention of both the SEC and Muddy
Waters, a short seller. Concerned about the restructuring, the former
issued a formal order of investigation,134 while the latter published a
research report on EDU, in which it attacked EDU’s VIE structure by questioning whether New Oriental China could be regarded as a VIE of EDU
and whether New Oriental China could consolidate its member schools
into EDU’s operation.135 Three months later, the SEC’s investigation
results quieted the doubts raised by Muddy Waters. The SEC staff had no
objection to the Company’s inclusion of its OpCo, New Oriental China,
into its consolidated financial statements, and also had no objection to the
Company’s consolidation of New Oriental China’s schools into New Orien128. Overview, NEW ORIENTAL EDUCATION & TECHNOLOGY GROUP, http://
english.neworiental.org/Default.aspx?tabid=3463 (last visited Oct. 9, 2014).
129. See generally New Oriental Educ. & Tech. Group Inc., Registration Statement
(Form F-1), (Aug. 22, 2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/
1372920/000119312506177813/df1.htm.
130. Press Release, New York Stock Exchange, NYSE Welcomes New Oriental Education & Technology Group, Inc. (Sept. 7, 2006), available at http://www1.nyse.com/
press/1157538336576.html.
131. Press Release, New Oriental Educ. & Tech. Group Inc., New Oriental Further
Strengthens Corporate Structure (July 11, 2012), available at http://www.prnewswire
.com/news-releases/new-oriental-further-strengthens-corporate-structure-162052955
.html.
132. Id.
133. See id.
134. Press Release, New Oriental Educ. & Tech. Group Inc., New Oriental Announces
Unaudited Financial Results for the Fiscal Quarter and Fiscal Year Ended May 31, 2012
(July 17, 2012), available at http://investor.neworiental.org/phoenix.zhtml?c=197416
&p=irol-newsArticle_Print&ID=1715179&highlight=; Dinny McMahon & Kathy Chu,
China Clamps Down on Corporate Sleuthing, WALL ST. J., July 20, 2012, at C10.
135. Report on New Oriental Education & Technology Group: Initiating Coverage on
EDU-Strong Sell, MUDDY WATERS RESEARCH, 26-29 (July 18, 2012), available at http://
www.muddywatersresearch.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/MW_EDU_07182012
.pdf.
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tal China or into New Oriental China’s WFOE.136
Even after the abovementioned restructuring, however, the company
still faces risks. As indicated by Muddy Waters, EDU lacks the contracts
that would enable it to substantially influence the daily operations and
material decisions of New Oriental China.137 In fact, by its very own
admission, EDU conceded that contractual arrangements may not be as
effective as direct ownership, stating that “if New Oriental China, any of its
schools and subsidiaries or its shareholder fails to perform its respective
obligations under the contractual arrangements,” EDU could only rely on
relief after the fact.138 That perhaps was also the reason why the SEC indicated that it would continue to review EDU’s disclosure documents after
releasing the investigation result.139
V. Uncertainty and Invalidity Surrounding the Contracts
The aforementioned parties threatened to challenge or even unilaterally terminate the VIE agreements because the legal validity of these contracts is highly questionable or seriously tenuous under Chinese laws.
Article 52 of Contract Law of the PRC reads:
A contract shall be null and void under any of the following
circumstances:
(1) a contract is concluded through the use of fraud or coercion by one
party to damage the interests of the State;
(2) malicious collusion is conducted to damage the interests of the State, a
collective or a third party;
(3) an illegitimate purpose is concealed under the guise of legitimate acts;
(4) damaging the public interests;
(5) violating the compulsory provisions of laws and administrative
regulations.140

Since the VIEs have been employed to circumvent Chinese regulations on
foreign ownership or the associated approval process, items (3) and (5) of
136. Press Release, New Oriental Educ. & Tech. Group Inc., New Oriental Announces
Unaudited Results for the First Fiscal Quarter Ended August 31, 2012 Group (Oct. 29,
2012), available at http://investor.neworiental.org/phoenix.zhtml?c=197416&p=irolnewsArticle_Print&ID=1750883&highlight=.
137. See Report on New Oriental Education & Technology Group: Initiating Coverage on
EDU-Strong Sell, supra note 135, at 27.
138. New Oriental Educ. & Tech. Group Inc., Form 20-F: Annual Report for Fiscal
Year 2012, 15 (Aug. 18, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/
1372920/000119312513382302/d566858d20f.htm.
139. Press Release, New Oriental Educ. & Tech. Group Inc., New Oriental Announces
Filing of Annual Report on Form 20-F for Fiscal Year 2012 (Oct. 29, 2012), available at
http://investor.neworiental.org/phoenix.zhtml?c=197416&p=irol-newsArticle_print&ID
=1744978&highlight=.
140. The Contract Law became effective on Oct. 1, 1999. 2 CHINESE LAW SERIES: CONTRACT LAW OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, art. 52 (promulgated by Order No. 15 of
the President of the People’s Republic of China, Mar. 15, 1999) (Wei Luo trans. 1999),
available at http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/11/content_1383564.htm
[hereinafter 2 CHINESE LAW SERIES].
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Article 52 are of most concern.141 There is no clear legislative or judicial
guide defining what constitutes “an illegitimate purpose” as stated in item
(3), which, therefore, subjects the term to varying interpretations. On the
other hand, “laws” in item (5) refers to those promulgated by the National
People’s Congress or its Standing Committee, and “administrative regulations” refers to those regulations issued by the State Council.142 The
Supreme People’s Court ruled that all courts shall only rely on laws and
administrative regulations to declare a contract invalid, while the rules formulated by ministries and commissions underneath do not apply.143
Moreover, even for laws and administrative regulations, their “compulsory
provisions” should be divided into those that are administrative in nature
as opposed to those that are of validity in nature; only the violation of the
latter would trigger the invalidation of a contract.144
Some recent arbitration and judiciary decisions have significantly
deepened the worries concerning VIE contracts and their performance.
A. Arbitration Cases of Shanghai CIETAC
In 2010 and 2011, two related arbitrations arising from a VIE dispute
were reviewed by the Shanghai Sub-commission of the China International
Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (Shanghai CIETAC); the arbitrations, though conducted by different arbitrators, both rendered awards
invalidating the VIE agreement and the entire arrangement on similar
grounds.145 These cases are the first in which Shanghai CIETAC has rendered a direct award based on the invalidity of VIEs.
Given the confidential nature of arbitration, limited information about
the facts and findings of these disputes exists and was only recently disclosed by the lawyers who represented these cases. A description of the
background of the case is quoted below:
T Company is a wholly Chinese-owned company engaged in the online
game operation business and has the internet content provider license and
other permits that cannot be secured by foreign-invested enterprises. The
foreign investor established a WFOE in China through a British Virgin
Islands company. The WFOE executed a series of profit conveyance agree141. See Donald Clarke, Who Owns the Chinese Internet?, CHINESE L. PROF BLOG (July
7, 2011), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/china_law_prof_blog/2011/07/who-ownsthe-chinese-internet.html.
142. Interpretations of the Supreme People’s Court of Certain Issues Concerning the
Application of the Contract Law of the People’s Republic of China (Part One), art. 4
(promulgated by the Adjudication Committee of the Supreme People’s Court, Dec. 29,
1999, effective Dec. 29, 1999), available at http://www.asianlii.org/cn/legis/cen/laws/
itspcocictaotclotproco1363/.
143. See id.
144. However, if violation of rules formulated by ministries or commissions results in
damaging public interests, or it is unclear whether certain compulsory provisions of
laws and administrative regulations is of validity in nature, but the violation of it results
in damaging public interests, the courts may refer to item (4) of Article 52 to hold the
contract invalid.
145. Kenneth Kong & Shelly Sui, Shanghai CIETAC’s Finding on VIE Case Raises
Plenty of Questions, CHINA BUS. L. J., 90– 91 (2013).
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ments with T Company and a series of control agreements with the founding
shareholder of T Company. In the course of their cooperation, a conflict
arose between the founder and investor over control of T Company. The
founder wished to regain control of T Company by denying the validity of
the VIE agreement, whereas the investor wished to have the VIE agreement
performed so as to achieve actual control of T Company.146

Therefore, the focus of the case was whether the VIE agreement and
arrangements were valid. Shanghai CIETAC tribunal eventually found:
that the core objective and result of the arrangement (which consisted
of securing control over the decision-making and returns of T Company
through the WFOE by executing the profit conveyance agreements and control agreements with T Company and the founder) was ‘to enable the
WFOE, which did not have online game operation qualifications, to participate in the operation of online games in the PRC and to obtain the
attendant returns.147
In the end, the tribunal made the following award:
Accordingly, the tribunal, based on PRC Contract Law, rendered an award
invalidating the VIE agreement on the grounds that the lawful form of the
VIE agreement (including both the control agreement and profit conveyance
agreement parts) covered up illegal objectives and, by extension, violated
mandatory provisions of administrative regulations of the state.148

There are a few caveats that need to be addressed. First, with respect to
online game business, the abovementioned 2009 GAPP Notice is clearly
pertinent. Yet, perhaps worrying is that the prohibition from the 2009
GAPP Notice was not from any law and administrative regulation and the
Shanghai CIETAC tribunal did not cite the 2009 GAPP Notice directly;
instead it used other, more general regulations, particularly item (3) of
Article 52 of PRC Contract Law.149 Second, not all of the agreements
under the VIE structure were petitioned to be scrutinized in the arbitrations, begging the following question: Should all of the agreements be
taken together as a whole for the purpose of review in order to render an
award, or could they be arbitrated in a piecemeal fashion? Are these
attendant agreements not also meaningful to the scope and enforcement of
the arbitration? Third, like in other countries, arbitration awards in China
are regarded as the decision of an individual case and, legally speaking,
would not constitute a viable reference in future proceedings.150
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Memorandum from Han Kun Law Offices on Legal Analysis on Recent Rulings
Related to VIE Structure, HAN KUN LAW OFFICES, art. 3.2 (July 8, 2013), available at www
.hankunlaw.com/backuser/picinfo/20137811354.pdf [hereinafter HAN KUN LAW
OFFICES].
150. See Catherine A. Rogers, Context and Institutional Structure in Attorney Regulation: Constructing an Enforcement Regime for International Arbitration, 39 STAN. J. INT’L L.
1, 37 n.198 (2003); Mark S. Hamilton, Sailing in a Sea of Obscurity: The Growing Importance of China’s Maritime Arbitration Commission, 3 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 477, 516
(2002).
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B. Chinachem Case by Supreme People’s Court
In 1995, Chinachem Financial Services (Chinachem) and China Small
and Medium Enterprises Investment Co. Ltd. (SME) entered into a series of
agreements, which included certain entrustment agreements and loan
agreements.151 Pursuant to the entrustment agreements, Chinachem,
through SME, subscribed to the capital of Minsheng Bank, and SME agreed
to hold this equity interest in Minsheng Bank on behalf of Chinachem,
managing and exercising all rights and interests associated with the shares
according to the instructions of Chinachem.152 Meanwhile, Chinachem
and SME also entered into loan agreements in which Chinachem agreed to
lend SME loans for subscribing capital in Minsheng Bank, with the interest
of the loan being equal to the dividends obtained from Minsheng Bank.153
The amount of loans was equivalent to the amount which was entrusted to
SME for subscribing capital of Minsheng Bank. Not surprisingly, those
agreements were designed to circumvent PRC laws and regulations on foreign investment in the financial industry.154
Nonetheless, the cooperation soon went awry. In 2001, SME brought a
lawsuit against Chinachem regarding the ownership of the shares in Minsheng Bank and the related dividends. After lengthy lawsuits, the Supreme
People’s Court issued the final judgment in December 2012, which held
that the agreements between Chinachem and SME were invalid on the
grounds that these agreements established a trust relationship that circumvented PRC laws and regulations: namely, the third item of Article 52 of
PRC Contract Law in which “an illegitimate purpose is concealed under
the guise of legitimate acts.”155
There are some commonalities between the Chinachem case and the
VIE structure, such as the involvement of overseas entities that seek to
dodge Chinese foreign investment regulations as well as the set of agreements which render the same effect in terms of control over the equity
interest by an entity other than the registered shareholders. However, four
significant differences exist between the two schemes.
First, the biggest problem in the Chinachem case is the circumventive
entrustment agreements through which SME was supposed to hold equity
interest on behalf of Chinachem. In contrast, no part of VIE agreements
would provide that the equity interest in the OpCo is held by the registered
shareholders on behalf of the WFOE.156 Second, Chinachem signed the
entrustment and loan agreements itself as an offshore company, while the
WFOE, a PRC incorporated and duly authorized enterprise, is the counterpart to all VIE agreements. Third, both sets of agreements in the
Chinachem case were entered into without the involvement of Minsheng
Bank and its other shareholders. In a typical VIE structure, the OpCo and
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

See
See
See
See
See
See

HAN KUN LAW OFFICES, supra note 149, at 2.
id.
id.
id.
id.; see also 2 CHINESE LAW SERIES, supra note 140, art. 52.
HAN KUN LAW OFFICES, supra note 149, at 6-7.
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all of its registered shareholders are the counterparties signing the agreements; this reduces the likelihood that the agreements would be held invalid on the grounds that the WFOE and particular shareholders of the OpCo
were colluding to damage the interests of the OpCo or its other shareholders.157 Fourth, Chinachem expected to receive the interests of the arguably
problematic “loans.”158 The WFOE under a VIE is usually paid for services
within the approved business scope provided to the OpCo.
Aside from these meaningful factual and legal differences, the
Chinachem case decision by the Supreme People’s Court is not a binding
precedent and, strictly speaking, has no reference value to subsequent
cases of a similar nature. That being said, it remains a very legitimate concern whether the attitude taken by the Chinese highest court in the
Chinachem case could possibly also reflect its broader and more general
view on the VIE structure. When considering this case in conjunction with
the two arbitration cases of Shanghai CIETAC, it is fair to say that a realistic sense of doubt exists with respect to the validity of the contracts underlying the VIE structure.
VI. The Reactions from Hong Kong and the U.S.
Cast in the shadows of doubt, the VIE in Mainland China has certainly
caused great concern in overseas stock markets that host the ListCo of the
arrangement. In particular, regulators and stock exchanges have responded
with a variety of actions, so as to offset the negative impact of such developments, and protect the interests of investors to the greatest extent possible.
A. The HKEx
Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Limited (HKEx) issued its first
listing decision opinion, viz. HKEx-LD43-3, in 2005 to address the
issue.159 It essentially adopted a disclosure-based approach to make decisions about companies using the VIE structure. Usually the appropriate
disclosure of risks, the insurance of proper operation, and the legality of
the contractual arrangements would enable a listing approval by HKEx.160
After the Alipay incident, the HKEx revised the rule in November
2011.161 In this amendment, it stated that the listing decision involving
VIEs would be made on a case-by-case basis, and the Listing Division
would normally refer the applicant to the Listing Committee if non157. See id.
158. See id. at 7.
159. See HKEx-LD43-3 (First Quarter of 2005), HONG KONG EXCHANGES AND CLEARING
LTD., (2005), available at http://www.hkex.com.hk/eng/rulesreg/listrules/listdec/docu
ments/LD43-3.doc.
160. See id.¶ ¶11, 13(c).
161. See HKEx-LD43-3 (First Quarter of 2005, updated in November 2011, August 2012,
November 2012, December 2012, November 2013 and April 2014), HONG KONG
EXCHANGES AND CLEARING LTD. (2014), available at http://www.hkex.com.hk/eng/rules
reg/listrules/listdec/Documents/LD43-3.pdf.
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restricted businesses were concerned.162 The latter indicated that the company would face a stricter review. In addition, the HKEx also required the
company to provide reasons for the use of VIE-structured contracts in its
business operation and to unwind these structured contracts as soon as the
law would allow the business to operate without them. To solve the
problems raised by the weak control of the VIE, as revealed in the Alipay
dispute, the HKEx required VIE agreements to: (1) grant the company’s
directors the power to exercise all rights of the OpCo’s shareholders; (2)
contain the provision of arbitration and corresponding judicial support;
and (3) ensure that structured contracts encompass provisions for dealing
with the OpCo’s assets.163
Amendments released in 2012 by the HKEx further elaborated upon
its disclosure requirements concerning VIEs. Now, a company must disclose (1) risks associated with conflicts of interests with VIE shareholders,
less effective control compared with direct ownership, (2) economic risks
to which the company is exposed as the beneficial of the VIE, and (3) possible raise of tax and regulatory risks. Moreover, the following corresponding arrangements also required disclosure: (1) arrangements to protect the
company in the event of death, bankruptcy or divorce of the VIE’s registered shareholders; (2) arrangements to solve the conflicts of interests with
VIE’s registered shareholders; (3) legal bases through which directors
believe the company effectively controls the VIE.164
In November 2013, the HKEx updated the rule again. The 2013
amendment limited the use of VIE structures mainly in two ways: (1) by
defining the position that the Exchange will accept the use of VIEs in
addressing the foreign ownership restriction only when restricted businesses are involved; (2) by making further requirements to lower the risks
of VIEs, including (a) Statements from OpCo’s shareholders to return any
consideration they received to the company when the company acquires
the OpCo to unwind the VIE structure; b) positive confirmation from PRC
legal advisers on the legality of the VIE structure, which must be supported
by appropriate regulatory assurance, where possible; (c) separate disclosure of the incomes from VIEs.165
The 2013 amendment was a reaction to the abovementioned arbitration cases of Shanghai CIETAC. While the amendment substantially
increased the difficulty for companies with the VIE structure to go public
in Hong Kong given the need to acquire appropriate regulatory assurance,
it is still possible. For instance, Forgame Holdings Limited listed on the
HKEx with a VIE structure in September 2013. In its prospectus, Forgame
claimed that they obtained oral confirmation from the regulatory authority
162. Id. ¶¶ 16-17; see also Legal Commentary: HKEx Updated Listing Decision on Contractual Arrangements, HAN KUN LAW OFFICES, 1 (Dec. 19, 2011), available at http://www
.hankunlaw.com/backuser/picinfo/20111222114152.pdf.
163. See HONG KONG EXCHANGES AND CLEARING LTD., supra note 159, ¶ 18.
164. See HKEx-LD43-3 (First Quarter of 2005, updated in November 2011, August 2012,
November 2012 and December 2012), supra note 161, ¶ 19.
165. See id. ¶¶ 18-19.
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that it had no objection to the contractual arrangements and that the contractual arrangements did not violate any PRC laws or regulations concerning online game operations.166 To sum up, the VIE structure would not
render companies unsuitable for listing on the HKEx, but the Exchange’s
attitude has become increasingly cautious since 2011, and with frequent
amendments, additional disclosure and other requirements for assurance
have been attached to VIEs.
B. The SEC
The SEC also is aware of the risks involving Chinese VIEs. Similar to
Hong Kong authorities, the SEC does not view the VIE structure negatively,
but does keep a close eye on information disclosure obligations relevant to
VIEs.
In the 2012 American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
(AICPA) National Conference on Current SEC and PCAOB Developments,
the SEC and its staff indicated that it continues to focus on the consolidation of overseas VIE arrangements.167 The SEC pointed out that a company
should provide information in its Management Discussion and Analysis
(MD&A) that would allow investors to assess the effects on the registrant’s
deconsolidation of the VIE and describe the economics flowing to the registrant as a result of its involvement in the VIE. Expected disclosures
include critical judgments made in relation to the company’s involvement
in the VIEs (such as the validity and enforceability of contracts with the
parties involved and whether there are any restrictions on the company’s
contractual rights) as well as details related to VIEs, such as the VIE’s
nature, purpose, size, and activities.168 These expectations overlapped significantly with the disclosure requirements in ASC 810-10-50-2AA, which
required the company to provide in their audited financial statements
information about their VIE.
After the Shanghai CIETAC arbitration cases and ChinaChem case,
which revealed the unfriendliness of Chinese adjudicators towards the VIE
structure, the SEC strengthened the information disclosure requirements.
An example of this practice occurred with Baidu Inc., a large Chinese
internet service provider.169 Though acclaimed as the best practice of
VIE,170 Baidu was pressed to not only discuss the impact of these recent
cases on its business and its formal or informal talks with the Chinese
166. See Forgame Holdings Ltd., Web Proof Information Pack, FORGAME HOLDINGS LTD.,
138 (Sept. 2013), available at http://www.hkexnews.hk/listedco/listconews/SEHK/
2013/1003/LTN20131003746.pdf.
167. O SEC! O SEC! Highlights of the 2012 AICPA National Conference on Current SEC
and PCAOB Developments, DELOITTE & TOUCHE LLP, 12 (Dec. 11, 2012), available at
http://www.deloitte.com/view/en_US/us/Services/audit-enterprise-risk-services/Financial-Statement-Internal-Control-Audit/Accounting-Standards-Communications/1747a3b
6cbb8b310VgnVCM3000003456f70aRCRD.htm.
168. Id.
169. The Baidu Story, BAIDU INC., http://ir.baidu.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=188488&p=
irol-homeprofile, (last visited Nov. 30, 2014).
170. See MUDDY WATERS RESEARCH, supra note 135.
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government about the structure, but also to specify who owns its various
VIEs.171 After negotiations, Baidu agreed to change its disclosure and add
that it could lose control over the assets in its VIEs, including the right to
use the well-known name baidu.com. According to Baidu, the result would
be a material adverse impact on its earnings and reputation.172
At the same time, the SEC never loosened investigations into VIE companies that may be responsible for wrongdoings. Soon after New Oriental
Education changed the shareholding structure of its VIE, the SEC issued a
formal order of investigation concerning whether a sufficient basis existed
for the consolidation of the VIE into the Company’s consolidated financial
statements.173 Yet, while the investigation result indicated no objection to
the consolidation, it did state that it would continue to review New Oriental Education’s disclosure documents.174 The company was also asked to
address the risks in its VIE agreements.175
On September 26, 2013, the former executives of another Chinese VIE
company, ChinaCast— which went public on NASDAQ through a reverse
merger with a publicly traded company— were charged by the SEC for
fraud and insider trading.176 The former executives failed to retain their
positions and were replaced by representatives of foreign investors; however, the successors didn’t win the war: the company seals, business
licenses and financial chops of the operation entities were all taken away
by the former executives, which rendered the daily operations impossible.177 Moreover, substantially all of the company’s books and records
were removed or destroyed.178
After ChinaCast retrieved the chops, the company found itself empty.
The former executives secretly embezzled most of the company’s assets by
171. Letter from Kathleen Collins, Accounting Branch Chief, SEC, to Jennifer Li,
Chief Fin. Officer, Baidu, Inc. (June 18, 2013), available at http://www.sec.gov/
Archives/edgar/data/1329099/000000000013033273/filename1.pdf.
172. See Letter from Jennifer Xinzhe Li, Chief Fin. Officer, Baidu, Inc., to Kathleen
Collins, Accounting Branch Chief, SEC (Aug. 29, 2013), available at http://ir.baidu
.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=188488&p=irol-SECText&TEXT=aHR0cDovL2FwaS50ZW5rd2l
6YXJkLmNvbS9maWxpbmcueG1sP2lwYWdlPTkxNzcyNzUmRFNFUT0wJlNFUT0wJ
lNRREVTQz1TRUNUSU9OX0VOVElSRSZzdWJzaWQ9NTc=.
173. See New Oriental Further Strengthens Corporate Structure, supra note 131.
174. See New Oriental Announces Unaudited Results for the First Fiscal Quarter
Ended August 31, 2012, supra note 136.
175. See Letter from Larry Spirgel, Assistant Dir., SEC, to Louis T. Hsieh, President
and Chief Fin. Officer, New Oriental Educ. & Tech. Grp. Inc. (Nov. 20, 2012), available
at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1372920/000000000012063314/filename
1.pdf
176. Litigation Release No. 22819, UNITED STATES SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N2 (Sept. 26,
2013), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2013/lr22819.htm.
177. ChinaCast Educ.n Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K), 1-3 (Apr. 19, 2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1261888/000114420412022714/v309
794_8k.htm [hereinafter ChinaCast Educ. Corp., (Apr. 19, 2012)].
178. ChinaCast Educ. Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K), 6 (Dec. 21, 2012), available
at http://www.getfilings.com/sec-filings/121221/CHINACAST-EDUCATION-CORP_8K/ [hereinafter Chinacast Educ. Corp., (Dec. 21, 2012)].
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withdrawing cash from bank accounts179 and transferring holding interests of operating entities to unrelated third parties.180 Additionally, the
CEO of ChinaCast, Mr. Chan,181 secretly pledged ChinaCast’s existing
term cash deposits as collateral to secure debts incurred by various third
parties which were unrelated with ChinaCast’s business.182 Both the SEC
and NASDAQ took action. NASDAQ suspended trading in ChinaCast on
April 2, 2012 and then delisted the stock on June 25, 2012.183 The SEC,
on the other hand, conducted a year-long investigation into the matter, ultimately charging the previous management.184
The SEC’s attitude towards the VIE paralleled its aggressive posture
toward Chinese-based companies in the area of extraterritorial enforcement. On December 3, 2012, the SEC charged affiliates of the “Big Four”
accounting firms185 based in China for refusing to provide audit work
papers and other related documents in compliance with SEC investigations
into potential wrongdoing of nine China-based companies whose securities
were publicly traded in the United States.186 Regardless, the respondents
argued that they “were ready, willing and able to produce documents [to
the SEC], but were unable to do so” because Chinese national security laws
prevented them from sharing such information.187 On January 22, 2014,
however, an administrative law judge ruled that the Chinese units of the
global “Big Four” accounting firms were suspended from auditing U.S.listed companies for six months.188 This sentence incited significant concern among Chinese-based companies.

179. Chan and other former executives withdrew over Rmb760 million (approximately US$120 million) in cash from the bank accounts of two subsidiaries of the company without the prior knowledge of the Board. See ChinaCast Educ. Corp., Current
Report (Form 8-K), 6 (May 14, 2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/
data/1261888/000114420412028609/v313134_8k.htm.
180. See ChinaCast Educ. Corp., (Apr. 19, 2012), supra note 177, at 1.
181. The company only effectively held a 49.2% indirect equity interest in an important holding subsidiary, which controlled two of three substantial operations, while Previously Issued Financial Statements claimed that the company had approximately 100%
shares. According to records from Hong Kong Companies Registry, the margin was held
by Chan. See ChinaCast Educ. Corp., (Dec. 21, 2012), supra note 178, at 1.
182. Id, at 2.
183. Complaint at 2– 3, SEC v. Chan Tze Ngon & Jiang Xiangyuan, 2013 WL
5376056 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2013) (No. 13-CIV-6828).
184. Id.
185. PricewaterhouseCoopers, Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu Ltd., Ernst & Young, and
KPMG.
186. Press Release, Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges China Affiliates of Big Four
Accounting Firms with Violating U.S. Securities Laws in Refusing to Produce Documents (Dec. 3, 2012) (on file with SEC), available at http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRe
lease/Detail/PressRelease/1365171486452#.UvsuhnmTSTW.
187. BDO China Dahua CPO Co., SEC Admin. Proc. File Nos. 3-14872, 3-15116, Initial Decision Release No. 553, 103 (Jan. 22, 2014).
188. See id. at 2.
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VII. Realigning Interests to Disperse the Undesirable Smog
A. The Evolving Tripartite Game
If one were to reflect upon the ups and downs of the past fifteen years,
it would become apparent that treatment of the VIE structure is a product
of the times. In particular, three groups of players have been gaming with
each other: Chinese entrepreneurs, foreign investors, and the Chinese government. In the first stage, ambitious Chinese business founders allied harmoniously with foreign Venture Capital or Private Equity (VC/PE) in
inventing this “workaround” to cope with the Chinese government and
achieve an indirect non-equity based investment in restricted or prohibited
industries.189 On the other hand, the VIE served as “a technical method
that provides regulatory authorities an “excuse” to naturally accept internet
enterprises’ offshore financing and listing— on which regulatory authorities
do not have any material disagreement no matter if the VIE exists or not—
without amending laws or regulations.”190 Further, “since the VIE was an
arguable issue, this unfinished controversy seemingly gave regulatory
authorities more potential leverage in regulating these companies.”191
After a new wave of VIE-styled overseas listings aimed to circumvent
the 2006 M&A Rules’ approval process, most notably Qinfa and its followers, it became difficult for Chinese regulatory authorities to tolerate VIEs,
deeming the structure a manipulative tool that helped companies transfer
their assets and profits offshore, even deliberately mocking PRC regulations. At the same time, the growth of China’s capital market has been
remarkable. Among other things, the Chinese-owned VC/PE industry
developed rapidly, and private sectors now have better access to raise capital, including the domestic public offering and early-stage venture capital.192 Likewise, the Shenzhen Stock Exchange set up ChiNext in 2009,
where qualified small and growing enterprises’ shares could be publicly
traded.193 Further, the listing rules on ChiNext are more flexible than
traditional IPO rules.194 More importantly, the Chinese government began
to encourage and support leading companies in emerging industries to list
on the Mainland stock markets.
Therefore, in the second stage, both regulatory authorities and courts
have been sending out unfavorable messages regarding VIEs; yet, taking
into account the number and size of companies currently listed overseas, it
would be impractical for the government to suddenly declare a wholesale
ban on the VIE structure. The extent of the dilemma and ambiguity that
surrounds usage of the VIE, however, was enough to influence other players’ behavior, imperiling the interests of foreign investors: business partners might have different ideas and interests, and ownership as a
shareholder is different from “ownership” by contract.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

See Schindelheim, supra note 18, at 208-09.
Rizzi, supra note 33.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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The contractual nature of VIE agreements presents a host of problems.
Because VIE agreements are contractual in nature, it is always possible for
Chinese founders to redeem the loans, thus obviating the equity pledge
agreement. Although they would regain all rights attributable to a shareholder, the economic right to the OpCo’s profits will still lie with the
ListCo. A more drastic situation is where the founders and OpCo breach
the contracts and pay damages, especially if it is more profitable or efficient to breach than to perform the contract.195 Ultimately, there the success of the VIE structure is predicated on the parties’ continued
commitment to uphold the contract.
Even worse, the unbridled founders could simply pull the rug from
under the ListCo and foreign investors by challenging the validity of the
agreements with the WFOE. The Chinese government’s distaste for the VIE
would further encourage the founders’ opportunistic behavior. This
course of action does not even take into account the time-consuming and
costly process for judicial intervention. Smog is a portmanteau of the
words smoke and fog to refer to smoky fog. Consider the following analogy, in which the dubious attitude of regulators and judges is compared to
a hazy fog and the brazen recantation of founders is akin to acrid smoke.
Under such inimical atmospheric conditions, which can be said to characterize Stage 2 of the historical treatment of VIEs, foreign investors choke on
each breath to the point of tears.
But the Chinese government may very well feel uncomfortable with
intervention. Some commentators surmise that the continued uncertainty
surrounding the VIE structure is likely “a deliberate policy of the Chinese
government to selectively facilitate foreign investment in particular industries while limiting foreign equity ownership.”196 In my opinion, such benefits, even if they exist, come at too high a cost. If the regulatory
inconsistency and vagueness were to continue together with their impacts
on judiciary outcomes, they would severely impair the confidence of foreign investors and undermine the reputation and welfare of China in the
long run. It is now time to start a new stage, Stage 3, refocused on the
protection of investors, both foreign and domestic, as well as on market
integrity.
B. Opening the Right Way
Taking the failures of the Giga Media and Anbow cases into consideration, a better structured set of contractual arrangements would serve the
goals of Hong Kong and American regulators. The foremost priority is to
ensure that the Chinese legal owner of the OpCo would maintain a sufficient stake in the success of the ListCo, which usually means giving the
195. Lake River Corp. v. Carborundum Co., 769 F.2d 1284 (7th Cir. 1985); Charles
Goetz & Robert Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties, and the Just Compensation Principle: A Theory of Efficient Breach, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 554 (1977); See, e.g., Robert Birmingham, Breach of Contract, Damage Measures, and Economic Efficiency, 24 RUTGERS L. REV.
273, 284 (1970).
196. Schindelheim, supra note 18, at 197.
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legal owner a significant amount of shares and a directorship and/or executive position in the offshore holding company.197 Binding the participating parties by establishing mutual interest and fiduciary duty would
reduce the incentives for Chinese founders to walk away or even steal and
sabotage the arrangement.
If the disagreement seems unavoidable, then it would also be helpful
to ensure that there are WFOE-friendly provisions for resolving disputes
(i.e., choice of forum and choice of law provisions that are favorable to the
WFOE). Nevertheless, even though the ListCo or foreign investors could
obtain desirable results overseas, as long as enforcement of that decision
has to occur in China, doubt will continue to exist over the validity of the
VIE structure, given that “an illegitimate purpose is concealed under the
guise of legitimate acts.” Similarly, although foreign regulators may keep
advising on how to improve the contract contents or even bluff to stop the
accounting consolidation treatment for Chinese VIEs, the Chinese government should take the initiative to reexamine and overhaul its relevant
policies.
First, the NDRC and MOFCOM should further reduce the restricted
and prohibited foreign investment categories in the Catalogue, drawing on
experiments from the Shanghai Free Trade Zone (Shanghai FTZ).198 The
Shanghai FTZ, which debuted in 2013, has opened many restricted industries to foreign investment; for example, value-added telecommunications
services.199 More importantly, the Shanghai FTZ has taken the innovative
“negative list” approach, through which foreign investors are allowed to
conduct any business (except certain reserved sectors) that is not set out in
the “negative list.” Both the Catalogue and negative list should not only
undergo more frequent periodical review, but should also be substantially
downsized. In May 2014, the NDRC promulgated new administrative measures on approval and filings of foreign investment projects and simplified
the governmental review and approval process, which is a movement in the
right direction.200
Second, the State Council and the legislature ought to revisit the rationale and criteria for foreign investment restrictions. Such restrictions were
originally borne out of consideration for economic security or to foster
certain national industries, with the goal of proactively preventing foreign
capital control. But now, VIEs and equity-styled “round trip investment”
197. See Robert Lewis, Foreign Investors in China Using the VIE Structure, THE LAWYER
(Nov. 11, 2011), http://www.thelawyer.com/foreign-investors-in-china-using-the-vari
able-interest-entity-structure/1010207.article.
198. For general information on the Shanghai FTZ, see http://en.shftz.gov.cn/AboutFTZ/Introduction/.
199. MIIT and Shanghai Municipal People’s Government, Guanyu Zhongguo (Shanghai) Ziyou Maoyi Shiyan Qu Jinyibu Duiwai Kaifang Zengzhi Dianxin Yewu de Yijian
(
) (Jan. 6,
2014), available at http://www.miit.gov.cn/n11293472/n11293832/n12843926/n1391
7072/15821232.html.
200. See People’s Republic of China Order No. 12, NAT’L DEV. AND REFORM COMM’N
(May 17, 2014), http://www.sdpc.gov.cn/zcfb/zcfbl/201405/t20140520_612252.html.
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are more like a gimmick in pursuit of favorable tax treatments or freer asset
transfer, carried out by special purpose vehicles (SPV) which are established in tax havens usually owned and controlled by Chinese citizens or
recently naturalized foreigners, collectively referred to as “fake foreign
investors.” Meanwhile, once the SPV is listed, the indirect foreign investors
are just financial investors (such as VC/PE) or public investors and, in
most cases, none of them have the will or capacity to control the business
operations in China. Admittedly, while there is a need to intervene from
the perspectives of tax, foreign exchange, or capital flow regulation, the
current restrictions seem overly superficial, counterproductive, and starkly
restrict the nationality of “ownership” while entirely disregarding the
nationality of “control.”
Third, MOFCOM and CSRC should make available a clear and workable procedure for the review and approval that was mandated by the 2006
M&A Rules as soon as possible. In May 2007, August 2008, and May
2011, SAFE largely fulfilled its own part by issuing Circular No. 106, Circular No. 142, and Circular No. 19 respectively, which all dealt with foreign exchange administration.201 In July 2014, SAFE released Circular No.
37 which further clarified and eased the foreign exchange regulatory procedures regarding SPVs and round trip investments.202 But, as mentioned
above, the lack of clear guidelines for implementation in the areas of foreign investment and securities regulation virtually installed a “class wall”
against equity-styled round trip investments and contributed substantially
to the second surge of VIEs. Using the analogy of the front door vis– a-vis
the side door, once the direct equity investment becomes feasible and the
approval becomes process reasonable, the attractiveness of VIEs would fade
away.
Fourth, the current VIEs should be grandfathered on principle, and
MOFCOM should take the lead in streamlining the regulation of new VIEs.
Any retrospective ban would possibly create unpredictable market disruption as well as lawsuits; therefore, I am prone to the recommendation in the
CSRC Report concerning “policies which distinguish the old from the
new,” which implies that China-based companies with existing overseas
listings using VIE structures would, for the time being, be
201. Hui Cao and Susan Monroe, New SAFE Circular 19: Encouraging Round-Trip
Investments and Consolidating Regulation of In-bound and Out-bound Investments, STEPTOE
& JOHNSON LLP (June 2011), http://www.steptoe.com/publications-newsletter-227
.html.
202. See
, STATE ADMIN. FOR FOREIGN EXCH. (July 14, 2014), http://www.safe.gov
.cn/wps/portal/!ut/p/c5/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP0os3gPZxdnX293QwM
LE09nA09Pr0BXLy8PwwB3Q6B8pFm8s7ujh4m5jwFQ3t3AwNPEyd_PwznQ0MDTmI
DucJB9OFVYhhmjy3uHWQDlTYOdvUK9jYy8zSHy-OwHyRvgAI4G-n4e-bmp-gW5EQaZ
nrqOABlPSIw!/dl3/d3/L2dJQSEvUUt3QS9ZQnZ3LzZfSENEQ01LRzEwODRJQzBJSUpR
RUpKSDEySTI!/?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/wps/wcm/connect/safe_web_store/safe_
web/zcfg/zbxmwhgl/zjtzwhgl/node_zcfg_zbxm_kjtz_store/ce30120044b919a3a5ecf71f
a25ece03.
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grandfathered.203 Also, MOFCOM has adopted a new position against the
VIE structure, one which is contextualized in national security and antitrust reviews, which has led to a new wave of speculation. In the future, a
transparent and uniform review process targeting the VIE structure and
focusing on the abovementioned control test should be worked out and
initiated by MOFCOM, and supported by other agencies such as MIIT,
CSRC, SAIC and SAT.
As a whole, China is moving from a regulatory state toward a more
rule-based and market oriented country. The market should play a decisive
role in the allocation of resources, while the non-public sector should be
encouraged to expand, which will in turn stimulate vitality and creativity
in the whole economy.204 Against such a backdrop, the Chinese government must speed up transforming itself into a service-oriented government. Forcing the existing ListCos to dismantle the VIE structure is not in
line with this trend, nor is it effective to shut one’s eyes to such an open
secret or awkwardly attempt to address it through beating about the bush.
A clear stance and a systemic solution from MOFCOM and others under
the coordination of the State Council will drive off the undesirable haze
and relieve the court and investors of their concerns. Moreover, collaboration with foreign regulators should be enhanced to discipline the related
parties and deter the opportunistic misconduct in violation of fiduciary
duty.
Conclusion
The past fifteen years have witnessed a lot of successful VIEs which
encouraged Chinese businesses to develop and list overseas, sidestepping
foreign investment restrictions and obscuring regulatory hurdles. Increasingly, however, this practice has been losing its magical powers. Within
China, from various industry regulators to local governments, an air of
skepticism has gathered around the VIE arrangement. In the wake of different incidents, such as national security and antitrust reviews, MOFCOM
kept sending out disquieting signals of warning; the internal CSRC Report
made unfavorable recommendations too. Meanwhile, the underlying vulnerability of the VIE contractual arrangement manifested through cases
such as Giga Media, ChinaCast, and Anbow Education, and allegations of
breach of contract and disputes over control seriously distressed Alibaba
and New Oriental Education. Recently, Shanghai CIETAC arbitrations and
the Chinachem case further exposed the Achilles’ heel of the VIE, namely,
controversy concerning its validity and enforcement.
203. China VIE Structure for Foreign Investment under Attack from Multiple Directions:
Will It Emerge (Relatively) Unscathed or Is Its Very Survival Threatened?, HOGAN LOVELLS
(Jan. 2012), available at http://www.hoganlovells.com/files/Publication/7acf9f60-c4d84363-aa1c-9b76af0cdd0d/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/92f53946-f08c-4125-9d
c7-a43946eb8b2b/Hogan_Lovells_Client_Note_-_China_VIE_Structure_for_Foreign_In
vestment_Under_Attac.pdf.
204. CPC Acknowledges Market’s “Decisive” Role, XINHUANET (Nov. 12, 2013), http://
news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-11/12/c_132882359.htm.
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The three sets of trouble that VIEs are facing also have impacts on
each other. With more government regulatory interference, the chance that
adjudicators will invalidate the contracts of a VIE structure increases. Bearing this outcome in mind, the founder and registered owner of an OpCo
tends to be more unscrupulous, even using it as leverage to push the
outside investors of the ListCo into the corner. When fights over control
get more messy and rampant, the Chinese government is more likely to
take an even tougher line against such practice. The combination of these
three factors creates a self-enforced, vicious spiral, and would possibly
drive the VIE towards a perilous and catastrophic end.
Outside of China, the exacerbating hassle and the volatility of stock
prices hurt, upset and scared away foreign investors from China-based, VIE
structured, listed companies. In September 2014, Alibaba Group (NYSE:
BABA, excluding Alipay) completed its IPO in the U.S.205 and set the new
world record for fundraising;206 but, commentators continued to worry
about its corporate governance vulnerabilities, including the VIE issue.207
Meanwhile though not disdaining the VIE structure per se, both the SEC
and HKEx became more vigilant, mandating further disclosure and limitations. As the distrust accrued, a premium would be replaced by a discount
in terms of evaluation. Securities intermediaries and lawyers found it
more difficult and risky to appease and ensure their clients. The cost for
Chinese businesses to raise capital globally would inevitably increase.
When former allies turn their backs against each other, “variable interest
entities” might disappointingly degrade into “varied interest entities”.
It is not in the best interest of China to allow this murky status quo.
Although deliberative and selective regulation might offer some temporary
benefits, in the long term it irreparably impairs the Chinese reputation and
the integrity of the rule of law. To deter the egregiousness of opportunistic
behaviors, the Chinese government should cooperate more closely with foreign regulators and provide stronger protection for foreign investors.208
The existing VIEs could be grandfathered if there is no other violation.
More importantly, a collective and coordinated regulatory framework
should be set up for the VIE practice, a framework that is less restrictive,
more transparent, and more user friendly. The State Council may require
MOFCOM to take the lead and start to study the feasibility of reform as
soon as possible, to refine and transform the Catalogue into one that is
styled as a negative list, to recalibrate the foreign investment criteria based
on a more precise “control” test, and to streamline and clearly define the
review and approval process.
205.
, FT CHINESE.COM (Sept. 22, 2014), http://
www.ftchinese.com/story/001058311.
206.
, FT Chinese.com (Sept. 22, 2014), ttp://www.ftchinese
.com/story/001058308.
207.
, supra note 205.
208. The CSRC has signed 58 Memorandum of Understandings (MOUs) with securities and/or futures regulators from 54 countries or regions worldwide. See CSRC Signed
MOU with Jersey Financial Services Commission (April 18, 2014), http://www.csrc
.gov.cn/pub/csrc_en/affairs/Cooperation/201406/t20140612_255983.html.
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In both the U.S. and China, the VIE is a joint product of market and
regulation, and should be treated as a normal option which a business can
choose, rather than a mere trick of seeking the unjustifiable benefits of
regulation arbitrage. In choosing equity or contract, entrepreneurs and
investors are entitled to negotiate and decide on their own structure, contingent upon clear and accurate disclosure of the structure and its associated risks. For the sake of the parties involved in the VIE, it is advisable and
beneficial to rid the smog that clouds its usage, and revert to its pure
origins.

